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THE PROGRESSIVENESS OF THE LOCHNER COURT
MICHAEL J. PHILLIPS*
In 1913, the legal historian Charles Warren published an article en-
titled "The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court."' Con-
trary to charges that the Court was a reactionary obstacle to social legis-
lation, Warren maintained that it had actually "been steady and consis-
tent in upholding all State legislation of a progressive type."2 According
to Warren, the Court had rejected over ninety-five percent of the Four-
teenth Amendment due process and equal protection challenges it con-
sidered during the years 1887 to 191 . Of the successful challenges,
furthermore, the vast majority involved "private rights of property," and
very few concerned "social justice" legislation.' This record, Warren
concluded, showed "the responsiveness of the Court to the changing
needs of the times," and revealed it as "a bulwark to the State police
power, not a destroyer."
Needless to say, Warren's view of the old Court's (or Lochner
Court's)6 Fourteenth Amendment decisions has not been the dominant
view. Indeed, "progressive" is one of the last labels most past or present
* Professor of Business Law, School of Business, Indiana University. B.A., 1968, Johns
Hopkins University; J.D., 1973, Columbia University; LL.M., 1975, George Washington University;
SJ.D., 1981, George Washington University.
1. Charles Warren, The Progressiveness of the United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L.
REV. 294 (1913) [hereinafter Warren, Progressiveness]. Warren later analyzed the Court's Contract
Clause and burden-on-commerce decisions for the period 1887-1911. See Charles Warren, A
Bulwark to the State Police Power-The United States Supreme Court, 13 COLUM. L. REv. 667
(1913).
2. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 1, at 295.
3. Specifically, Warren said that the Court considered 560 Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection cases during this period, and that the Court struck down the challenged
law in only 37 of these cases. See id. at 294-95, 309; see generally id. at 296-307, nn.7-27 (listing
the relevant cases).
4. Id. at 308-09. Specifically, Warren's assertion was that 34 of the 37 successful challenges
involved rights of private property. These cases concerned matters such as: deprivations of property
without notice or a hearing; taxation of property outside the state's jurisdiction; confiscatory rate
decisions by state legislatures or utility commissions; and various other deprivations of railroad
property. In addition, there were three "social justice" cases: Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64
(1905) (using due process to strike down a state maximum hours law for bakery employees),
overruled by Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952) and Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372
U.S. 726 (1963); Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540, 565 (1902) (invalidating a state
antitrust law on equal protection grounds), overruled in part by Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141
(1940); and Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 590-93 (1897) (finding invalid a state law that
forbade the obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from any carrier which had not fully
complied with state law).
5. Warren, Progressiveness, supra note 1, at 310.
6. The reference, of course, is to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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observers would attach to the old Court.7 Yet if Warren's numbers are
correct and if they exemplify the entire Lochner era,8 maybe this consen-
sus is wrong. To resolve the disagreement, this article examines the Su-
preme Court's substantive due process decisions for the years 1902-
1932.0 Although it is widely recognized that the old Court rejected more
substantive due process challenges than it granted," to my knowledge no
one has explored the actual numbers in much detail.
The article begins by sketching some standard perceptions and criti-
cisms of the Lochner Court, views that already were prevalent by the
time Warren wrote. The article then lays out the Supreme Court's sub-
stantive due process decisions during the period 1902-1932. This section
considers most of the doctrine's many applications, emphasizes the nu-
merous decisions in which the Court upheld the challenged government
action, and estimates the ratio of rejected challenges to successful ones.
The article next summarizes its findings, which support Warren's general
message if not his specific numbers. After that, it discusses those find-
7. Although it may be vain to define so amorphous a term as "progressive," as used in this
article "progressive" includes the following elements: (1) the perception that America's
industrialization created significant disparities in bargaining power between business firms and
individuals, as well as other social problems; (2) the belief that positive government intervention was
needed to correct these problems; and (3) the belief that advances in social science knowledge gave
such intervention good prospects of success. See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE GUARDIAN OF EVERY
OTHER RIGHT: A CONSTrTUnONAL HISTORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 101-02, 104 (1992) (mentioning
these three elements while describing turn-of-the-century-progressivism).
8. A later Warren study, based on the years 1889-1918, found that of the 422 Supreme Court
cases involving Fourteenth Amendment due process or equal protection challenges during that
period, in only 53 did the Court strike down the challenged regulation. Of the 53, only 14 concerned
legislation affecting the general rights of individuals. CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 741 (rev. ed. 1928). But this study does not include the 1920s, the decade when
the Court was most prone to strike down social legislation on Fourteenth Amendment grounds. See,
e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-
1986 at 133-34 (1990); ALPHEUS THOMAS MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: FROM TAFr TO WARREN
70-71 (1968) (noting the Court's increased activism during the 1920s).
However, it is doubtful whether the Court's 1920s activism would have changed Warren's
conclusions much. The reason for such doubt is that the increase in the number of laws invalidated
on substantive due process grounds during the 1920s, while significant, probably would not have
greatly affected his overall numbers. A 1927 study limited to due process challenges to exercises of
the police power suggests as much. The study found that the Supreme Court struck down six of 98
such laws during the period 1868-1912 and seven of 97 during the years 1913-20, but only 15 of 53
over the years 1921-27. Ray A. Brown, Due Process of Law, Police Power, and the Supreme Court,
40 HARV. L. REv. 943-44 (1927).
9. In this article, substantive due process means courts' use of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments' due process clauses to assess the constitutionality of substantive government action.
Often, but not always, this assessment is conducted through some kind of means-ends analysis. Of
course, a successful substantive due process claim also requires that the challenged government
action deprive someone of life, liberty, or property; but finding such a deprivation rarely was a
problem in the cases we shall consider. As we shall see, finally, the deprivation in question need not
have involved, and in fact usually did not involve, freedom of contract. See infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text.
10. I explain my choice of these particular years at infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
11. E.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUIrONAL LAW 567 (2d ed. 1988).
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ings' implications for the standard attacks on Lochner era substantive
due process. I conclude by briefly speculating about the reasons why the
old Court's qualified progressiveness has not been more widely recog-
nized.
I. THE STANDARD CRITIQUE OF LOCHNER ERA SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS
The most common criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process
often come conjoined with, or presuppose, a familiar picture of the cases
that best represent the era. Because the criticisms make more sense
against the backdrop the picture provides, I briefly discuss the latter be-
fore considering the former in more detail.
A. The Usual Account
Standard accounts of Lochner era substantive due process tend to
tell the same story with the same fifteen to twenty cases.'2 After discuss-
ing some precursor decisions,'3 those accounts usually identify the
Court's 1897 decision in Allgeyer v. Louisiana" as the first Supreme
Court case using due process to invalidate a substantive regulation of the
economy." Then the discussion usually shifts to Lochner v. New York"
itself, where the Court struck down a maximum-hours law for bakery
employees. Usually mentioned in connection with Lochner are three
maximum hours cases in which the Court upheld the challenged law-
Holden v. Hardy," Muller v. Oregon,'8 and Bunting v. Oregon.'9 Also fre-
quently mentioned in this connection are the old Court's controversial
decisions in Adair v. United States'" and Coppage v. Kansas,' each of
12. See generally, GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 437-39, 444-57 (12th ed.
1991); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 153-57 (1960); JOHN E. NOWAK
ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 340-50 (3d ed. 1986); BERNARD H. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIBFRTS
AND THE CONSTITrTON 110-55 (1980); TRIBE, supra note 11, at 567-86; Michael J. Phillips,
Another Look at Economic Substantive Due Process, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 265, 270-82.
13. See, e.g., GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 433-39. For other, sometimes contrasting, accounts
of substantive due process's evolution in the Supreme Court after the Civil War, see CURRIE, supra
note 8, at 41-47; ELY, supra note 7, at 86-91; BENJAMIN F. WRIGHTr, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
CONSTrUTIONAL LAw 95-105 (1946).
14. 165 U.S. 578, 593 (1897) (striking down a state law forbidding procurement of marine
insurance on in-state property with any insurer that had failed to comply with state law).
15. Id. at 590-93. Receiving less attention today, however, is an 1898 case whose practical
impact was considerably greater than that of Allgeyer. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 526 (1898)
established the courts' power to use due process to review the substantive fairness of railroad rates
and rates for other regulated industries. For more on Smyth and its numerous progeny, see infra notes
77-90 and accompanying text.
16. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
17. 169 U.S. 366, 395-97 (1898) (upholding a state maximum hours law for workers in
underground mines).
18. 208 U.S. 412, 422-23 (1908) (upholding a state maximum hours law for women).
19. 243 U.S. 426, 438 (1917) (upholding a state maximum hours law for factory workers).
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which struck down laws limiting management's power to exclude or
discharge union employees.
During the 1920s, the Court became more aggressive in its use of
substantive due process.' Perhaps the clearest and most notorious exam-
ple is its 1923 decision in Adkins v. Children's Hospital,' which invali-
dated a minimum wage law for women. But the 1920s witnessed other
well known applications of substantive due process as well. These in-
clude the trio of Tyson & Brother v. Banton,"' Ribnik v. McBride,' and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co.,' each of which struck down a state price
regulation.' They also include two "personal rights" decisions: Meyer v.
Nebraska28 and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.' Also getting some mention
are Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan" and Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co.3
Getting relatively short shrift but some occasional brief attention, finally,
are the old Court's decisions striking down restrictions on entry to a
trade, business, occupation, or profession; the most-noted examples are
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann"2 and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge.3
20. 208 U.S. 161, 179-80 (1908) (striking down a federal law that forbade the firing of
railroad workers due to their union affiliation), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Co. v. N.L.R.B.,
313 U.S. 177 (1941).
21. 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (striking down a state law that forbade "yellow dog" contracts
conditioning an employee's employment on his not becoming or remaining a union member),
overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Co., 313 U.S. 177 (1941).
22. See Brown, supra note 8, at 944-45.
23. 261 U.S. 525, 559, 562 (1923), overruled in part by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937). The law struck down in Adkins also covered children. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 539-40.
24. 273 U.S. 418, 445 (1927) (invalidating a state law regulating the resale price of theater
tickets), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236
(1941).
25. 277 U.S. 350, 357 (1928) (invalidating a state law regulating the fees charged by
employment agencies), overruled in part by Olsen, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
26. 278 U.S. 235, 245 (1928) (striking down a state law fixing the price of gasoline),
overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941).
27. Additionally, these cases indirectly relied upon another much discussed due process
decision that preceded the Lochner era: Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876). Generally, Munn
established that the states have considerable power to regulate businesses "affected with a public
interest." Munn, 94 U.S. at 130. The trio of cases discussed here might be said to have pursued a
negative implication of Munn: that for businesses not so affected, the regulation of prices is
unconstitutional. See, e.g., Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430.
28. 262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923) (striking down a state law that forbade both the teaching of
any subject in any language other than English, and the teaching of any such language as a language
until after the eighth grade).
29. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a state law which required that all children
between 8 and 16 attend a public school).
30. 264 U.S. 504, 517 (1924) (striking down a statute which regulated the weights at which
bread loaves could be sold).
31. 270 U.S. 402, 409-15 (1926) (overturning a law that forbade the use of "shoddy," or
various torn or cut up fabrics, in beds, pillows, furniture, and other goods).
32. 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932) (striking down a state law restricting entry to the ice
industry).
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The standard account naturally includes two important 1930s cases
marking the end of the Lochner era. The first, Nebbia v. New York,' ef-
fectively negated the price regulation cases mentioned earlier.'5 The sec-
ond, the Court's 1937 decision in West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,36 over-
ruled Adkins while upholding a state minimum wage law for women."
West Coast Hotel v. Parrish is widely regarded as the case that deci-
sively signalled the end of Lochner era substantive due process.38
B. The Most Important Criticisms
Although the pie can be cut differently, here I divide the many at-
tacks on Lochner era substantive due process into three groups. The first
basically criticizes the old Court for its excessive activism. The second
and third criticisms fault it for the result of that activism: the invalidation
of progressive social legislation designed to protect workers and other
powerless individuals from the predations of big business. According to
the second critique, this was due to the Court's innocent but misguided
embrace of traditional economic liberties that had outlived their time.
According to the third, the Court knew perfectly well that it was serving
the interests of corporate America when it used due process to strike
down social legislation, and did so for precisely that reason. Of course,
not all critics of the old Court's substantive due process decisions make
each of these three criticisms, and the third seems less common today
than formerly.
1. The Illegitimacy of Substantive Due Process
Traditionally, critics of Lochner era substantive due process have
attacked it for including freedom of contract within the liberty protected
by due process.39 But whatever history may or may not say about the
33. 278 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1928) (striking down a state law requiring that drug stores be
wholly owned by a licensed pharmacist or pharmacists), overruled by North Dakota State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores Inc., 414 U.S. 156 (1973).
34. 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (upholding a state law authorizing the fixing of milk prices by a
state body).
35. See Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 533-37.
36. 300 U.S. 379, 398-400 (1937).
37. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 398-400. A year earlier, however, a divided Court had
upheld a minimum wage law for women. See Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587
(1936), overruled in part by Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel. W. Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236
(1941).
38. E.g., Robert G. McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An
Exhumation and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 34, 36-37. However, the somewhat aggressive
Supreme Court review of railroad and utility rate regulation did not die until Federal Power Comm'n
v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 619 (1944). RICHARD J. PIERCE & ERNEST GELLHORN,
REGULATED INDUSTRIES IN A NUrSHELL 98-99 (1994).
39. See Learned Hand, Due Process of Law and the Eight-Hour Day, 21 HARv. L. REv. 495,
495 (1908) (".[L]iberty' gauranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment has come to mean the right to
pursue one's individual purposes as one likes and to make contracts for that end .... [Sbo to construe
1998]
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term's meaning, on its face the word liberty is a capacious one. And if
that term is broad enough to contain the right to an abortion, ' why should
it not include freedom of contract? Questions of constitutional interpre-
tation aside, this traditional criticism is misplaced for another reason: its
irrelevance. Whatever people may think, relatively few of the Lochner
era cases using substantive due process to strike down government action
explicitly proceeded on the assumption that the challenged law restricted
freedom of contract." And even if many cases had done so, they could
have achieved the same result by construing the term "property" broadly.
If property is conceived as a bundle of rights regarding a thing, among
them the right to alienate that thing, then one's having property rights in
x includes one's freedom to contract it away. '2 Here, x could include
one's own labor.
A more promising interpretivist attack on Lochner era substantive
due process emphasizes the term "due process of law" rather than the
word "liberty." This is the familiar objection that substantive due process
is illegitimate because the traditional meaning of Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment due process is procedural. '3 On this view, "'substantive due
process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'"
And activist courts that employ it are unjustifiably frustrating the major-
ity will expressed in legislation. ' Almost any of the previous cases in our
standard account could serve as an example. To one observer, for exam-
ple, Lochner "is still shorthand in constitutional law for the worst sins of
subjective judicial activism." The modem (post-193,7) Court has con-
the term 'liberty' is entirely to disregard the whole juristic history of the word."). See generally
Roscoe Pound, Liberty of Contract, 18 YALE LJ. 454 (1909).
40. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (holding that the constitutional right of privacy is
founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty).
41. See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process
Effective? 48 MERCER L. REV. 1049, 1086 n.197 (1997) (concluding tentatively that only 11 such
cases exist). By "explicitly" I mean using the words "liberty of contract" or their like. In doing the
research for the present article, however, I frequently came upon freedom of contract claims in the
cases rejecting due process attacks on government regulation.
42. For example, one might naturally assume that cases like Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278
U.S. 235 (1929), which struck down a state law regulating the price of gasoline, id. at 245, made
freedom of contract the protected right. In fact, however, the statute was successfully attacked on the
theory that it deprived the claimant of property. Id. at 239. Although the Williams court did not
elaborate, perhaps this could be justified on the theory that ownership of gasoline includes the
freedom to sell it at a price of one's choosing. See Tyson & Bros. v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 429
(1927) (noting that an owner's right to fix a price for sale of property is an attribute of the property).
43. See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 269-82 (1977); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDIcI. REVIEW 14-21 (1980); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAw 43-49 (1990) (attacking Lochner-era substantive
due process on interpretivist grounds).
44. ELY, supra note 43, at 18.
45. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 43, at 44-45 (attacking Lochner on much the same basis).
46. Aviam Soifer, The Paradox of Paternalism and Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism: United
States Supreme Court, 1888-1921, 5 LAw & HIST. REV. 249, 250 (1987).
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tinually embraced this first criticism by saying that it does not sit as a
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or justice of social and economic
regulations."
2. The Ratification of Private Power
The deferential stance just described once typified Justices such as
Black and Douglas, but today it better describes the Court's conservative
wing.' As Hadley Arkes recently observed, "the conservatives have of-
ten been turned into moral skeptics and relativists, and they have brought
about the strangest turnabout in jurisprudence: The most conservative of
our judges have absorbed the jurisprudence of the New Deal and the jural
reflexes of Hugo Black." 9 The liberals, on the other hand, have reaf-
firmed substantive due process with a vengeance-mainly, but not exclu-
sively, through the constitutional right of privacy.' So far as social and
economic regulations are concerned, however, the Court continues its
post-1937 practice of deference? This creates a problem for modem
progressives honest enough to confront it: how to justify the resulting
constitutional double standard. One possibility is to affirm the greater
intrinsic importance of personal rights, but this seems arbitrary. Another
justification-maintaining that in practice economic rights become
meaningless in a way that personal rights do not-probably has been
more helpful. It also is another influential basis for condemning the
Lochner Court.
As Laurence Tribe once maintained, "Lochner's downfall did not
represent a denigration of economic liberties but a recognition that such
liberties were not meaningfully protected by the 'free' market, at least for
those who were more its victims than its masters." '52 To Tribe, in other
words, the double standard is justified not because personal rights are
intrinsically superior, but because the exercise of economic rights tends
toward their suppression. The main way in which this is said to occur is
47. E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726,729 (1963).
48. E.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 590
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
49. HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A JURISPRUDENCE
OF NATURAL RIGHTS 28 (1994).
50. See GUNTHER, supra note 12, at 491-583 (putting a discussion of the privacy cases inside
a chapter entitled "Substantive Due Process" and introducing it with a heading that begins "The
Revival of Substantive Due Process"). For a discussion of some little-known contemporary
applications of substantive due process, see Michael J. Phillips, The Nonprivacy Applications of
Substantive Due Process, 21 RUrGERS L.J. 537, 542-77 (1990).
51. See Phillips, supra note 50, at 544-46 and cases cited therein. But see BMW of N. Am. v.
Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996) (holding a grossly excessive punitive damages award unconstitutional).
This may be the first case since the 1930s to strike down government action involving an economic
matter on substantive due process grounds). See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1051-52 n.6.
52. TRIBE, supra note 12, at 1374.
53. For another statement of what is essentially the same view, see HOWARD GILLMAN, THE
CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
1998]
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through the superior bargaining power afforded by superior size and or-
ganization." Due to this superior power, "freedom of contract means the
freedom of the rich to impose terms."" And by invalidating progressive
social legislation whose aim was to rectify the imbalance, Lochner era
substantive due process ratified such exercises of private power.
Lochner, Adkins, Adair, and Coppage, which struck down legislation
designed to protect workers against the superior power of their employ-
ers, are obvious examples. Similarly, the old Court decisions striking
down price regulations and other consumer protection measures ratified
business power in other spheres.
3. Knowing and Willing Subservience to Business
The preceding argument--that Lochner era substantive due process
ratified private economic power-comes in two versions. The first says
that this consequence was the unintentional by-product of the Court's
belief in individual rights, limited government, facially neutral legisla-
tion, and the like. According to a 1951 biographer, for instance, the
problems with Justice George Sutherland's thinking were its excessively
abstract, speculative character, and its failure to focus upon the facts of
sociology and economics. The result was Sutherland's failure to see that
"when he talked of... freedom of contract, he was speaking of some-
thing that did not exist."' In much the same vein are suggestions that the
Lochner-era Justices decided the way they did because they grew up in a
simpler world where large corporations were few and laissez-faire there-
fore had meaning, or because of the socialization accompanying their
previous service as corporate lawyers.
But other characterizations of the old Court suggest less innocent
motives. During the 1920s, Alpheus Thomas Mason once remarked, the
Court "could be counted on to save the businessmen from the folly of
JURISPRUDENCE 63-64, 76-86, 147-60 (paperback ed. 1993). See also James L. Kainen, The
Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for Property and Contract Rights, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 87, 92 (1993) (capsulizing but not necessarily endorsing the same position).
54. See, e.g., WiLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 164-65 (1995); MELVIN 1. UROFSKY, A
MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 503 (1988).
55. WnI.AM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER LAW: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN LIFE
126 (1988).
56. JOEL FRANCIS PASCHAL, MR. JUSTICE SUTHERLAND: A MAN AGAINST THE STATE 241
(1951).
57. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 135-37 (1987)
(suggesting that Lochnerian decisions flowed partly from the Justices' attachment to the simpler
world of their youth, a world in which laissez-faire made sense); ARTHUR SELWYN MILLER, THE
MODERN CORPORATE STATE 46 (1976) (quoting Justice Samuel F. Miller to the effect that years of
serving as counsel for the railroads and for other forms of associated capital naturally biased judges
to decide in their favor); UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 502 (asserting that the old Court's conservative
justices were "intellectual prisoners" of outdated formalistic, laissez-faire ideas).
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legislators."58 Robert McCloskey enlarged on this implicit suggestion that
the Lochner era justices knew what they were doing by characterizing
their decisions as "an unadorned endorsement of the strong and wealthy
at the expense of the weak and poor."59 Archibald Cox went still further
in 1987 when he asserted that "the Lochnerian decisions flowed partly
from the willful defense of wealth and power." Others seem to claim
that this was the sole motive for those decisions.6' As a dissenting writer
once summarized the consensus on this subject, "most standard histories
and accounts of the Court between the 1880s and 1940s assume a pro-
business, anti-labor bias on the part of the majority." 2 Such assertions,
however, seem less common in recent years than they were a generation
ago.
II. SUBSTANTIVE DuE PROCESS IN THE LOCHNER COuRT: 1902-1932
Each of the three criticisms just sketched depends heavily upon the
belief that Lochner era substantive due process was a potent weapon
against government regulation of social and economic matters. Surely the
severity of the charge that the old Court offended against original intent
and democratic values varies with the number of occasions on which it
did so. The same is true for claims that the Court intentionally or inad-
vertently ratified business power over workers, consumers, and other
natural persons. Today, it remains widely accepted that the Lochner
Court used due process to strike down substantive government action on
some two hundred occasions.63 No matter how one defines substantive
due process, however, the real number is significantly lower.'
58. MASON, supra note 8, at 40-41; see also UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 631 (noting that
during the 1920s the Court "did all it could to placate industry").
59. ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE AGE OF ENTERPRIsE, 1865-
1910, at 84 (1951).
60. Cox, supra note 57, at 135.
61. See, e.g., MILLER, supra note 57, at 45-46 (positing that Lochner Court Justices knew
what they were doing and did not care).
62. Mary Cornelia Porter, That Commerce Shall be Free: A New Look at the Old Laissez-
Faire Court, 1976 Sup. CT. REV. 135, 138-40 & nn.10-30; see also GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 3-4,
207-08 n.8 (providing other such sources).
63. "The substantive due process/freedom of contract theory reached its apogee in 1905 in
Lochner v. New York .... and for the next thirty years provided the rationale for the Court to strike
down nearly two hundred regulations." UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 501. See also GUNTHER, supra
note 12, at 445 (discussing nearly 200 regulations struck down during the Lochner era);
MCCLOSKEY, supra note 12, at 101 (citing an observer who estimated that 184 decisions between
1899 and 1937 invalidated state laws on the basis of either the due process or the equal protection
clauses); TRIBE, supra note 11, at 567 n.2 (estimating that the Court invalidated state or federal
regulations wholly or partially on due process grounds 197 times between 1899 and 1937). Except
for UROFSKY, these sources do not explicitly say that the 200 or so invalidations they mention
proceeded on substantive due process grounds. Because they occur within discussions of Lochner
era substantive due process, however, they are most naturally read as referring to cases of that kind.
For more on such claims and their genesis, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 1056-59.
64. See generally Phillips, supra note 41, at 1060-80. In that article, I found approximately
100 decisions that I characterized as peripheral, penumbral, or borderline applications of substantive
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Even if the absolute number of laws invalidated by Lochner era
substantive due process is less than advertised, there might be other rea-
sons for regarding it as a major check on progressive social legislation.
One of these, the deterrent effect of some decisions on legislatures'
willingness to enact such legislation, obviously is difficult to quantify.
But Justice Souter has implicitly suggested another test of Lochner era
substantive due process's impact: the stringency of the judicial scrutiny it
imposed. Although the Lochner line of cases "routinely invoked a correct
standard of constitutional arbitrariness review," he has recently written,
"they harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist implementation
of the standard they espoused." As Souter's remark suggests, we cannot
determine the severity of Lochner era substantive due process review by
looking at the relatively lenient verbal standards the old Court applied,'
which do not at all resemble the rigorous review now employed when
government action restricts fundamental rights.67 Instead, we must ex-
amine the actual implementation of those standards. The obvious way to
do so, one would think, is to estimate the percentage of substantive due
process challenges that actually succeeded during the first third of the
century: the doctrine's kill ratio.
The present section tries to estimate this ratio. It concludes that
during the years 1902-1932, the Supreme Court decisions upholding
government action challenged on substantive due process grounds con-
siderably outnumbered those striking down such laws. I limit myself to
Supreme Court cases decided during the period 1902-1932 for three rea-
sons. The first is simply to make the article more manageable. The sec-
ond is that these years mark the Court tenure of substantive due process's
most illustrious critic, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. The third rea-
son is that the years 1902-1932 approximate the period when Lochner
due process. See id. at 1080. These cases used due process to advance values associated with other
constitutional provisions. Examples include the early incorporation cases (most of which involved
the First Amendment), the many decisions striking down rate regulations and other orders imposed
on railroads and other businesses affected with a public interest (which mostly involved values
proper to the Takings Clause), and a host of tax cases involving federalism and burden-on-commerce
concerns.
The article also identified 55 cases that it considered "core" applications of substantive due
process. Id. at 1080. These decisions applied values-mainly, the command that government action
not be arbitrary or that it not offend rights of special importance-that have no evident home other
than due process. Examples include cases involving land use, civil remedies, taxation, price
regulation, entry restrictions, other miscellaneous economic regulations, employment, and personal
rights. The present article mainly discusses the second group of cases, while including decisions in
which the Court rejected the substantive due process challenge. But it also includes two categories
from the "peripheral" group: the cases involving rate decisions and other sovereign commands
directed at regulated industries.
65. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2279 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
66. E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905) (stating that the challenged law must
have a direct relation to an appropriate and legitimate end).
67. E.g., Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2268 (stating that laws infringing upon fundamental liberty
interests must be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest).
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era substantive due process had its greatest impact. Very few laws were
struck down on that basis before 1902," and the doctrine lost much of its
punch after 1932.'
Lest there be any confusion on the point, this section limits itself to
substantive due process cases: decisions using the Due Process Clauses
of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to attack the substantive fair-
ness of government action." For the most part, the section ignores other
constitutional attacks on the challenged law (most often equal protection
challenges) that are contained within the same case or intertwined with
the substantive due process discussion. Furthermore, this section tries to
limit itself to cases that clearly proceed under due process and that use
68. The main such cases are: Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684 691-99
(1899) (using due process to strike down a state law ordering a railroad to sell certain tickets for a set
fee) overruled in part by Pennsylvania R.R. v. Towers, 245 U.S. 6 (1917); Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S.
466, 522-50 (1898) (striking down railroad rates on combined due process/takings grounds)
overruled by Federal Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575 (1942) (narrowing
Smyth to the point that it was no longer good law); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-93
(1897) (upholding state statute forbidding obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from
any carrier not fully complying with state law). See also Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm'n, 134 U.S. 418, 456-58 (1890); Phillips, supra note 41,
at 1050 n.4, 1052 n.6 (discussing Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry); cf. Duluth & Iron Range R.R.
v. St. Louis County, 179 U.S. 302, 304-05 (1900) (holding state law that deprived railroad of
consideration due under an earlier grant did not violate Contract Clause due to reserved right to
amend, but did offend equal protection and due process); Dewey v. Des Moines, 173 U.S. 193, 196-
204 (1899) (striking down on due process grounds a tax assessment against an out-of-state party
owning in-state property, where the assessment was for the amount by which the liability exceeded
the amount realized from the in-state property's sale); Norwood v. Baker, 172 U.S. 269, 275-97
(1898) (assessing costs of property's condemnation for road on a landowner whose land the road
crossed violates principle that the land must be specially benefitted by the activity the assessment
funds).
69. The most important successful post-1932 substantive due process challenges are:
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603-18 (1936) (striking down a state
minimum wage law for women); Great N. Ry. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135, 145-53 (1936) (using pre-
Depression numbers to value claimant's property for tax purposes violates due process); Railroad
Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330, 346-61 (1935) (striking down provisions of the
Railroad Retirement Act on what are ostensibly Commerce Clause grounds, but in reality are
substantive due process grounds); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 533-36 (1933) (striking
down portion of chain store tax that imposed an additional tax on chains with stores in different
counties because it violates due process). Cf. Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utils. Corp., 300 U.S.
55, 68-81 (1937) (holding that a gas proration order limiting production of a utility's wells violates
due process); Treigle v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S. 189, 194-98 (1936) (holding that a state
law changing business's obligation to maintain a fund to pay shareholders violates due process and
the Contract Clause); Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 294 U.S. 613, 618-23
(1935) (striking down on combined due process/takings grounds highway commission order making
pipeline company change its transmission lines without compensation); Johnson Oil Ref. Co. v.
Oklahoma ex rel. Mitchell, 290 U.S. 158, 161-63 (1933) (holding that a tax on out-of-state railroad
tank cars violates due process).
In addition, the Court struck down several state utility rate decisions after 1932. See West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 79, 80-83 (1935); West v. Chesapeake & Potomac
Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662, 668-80 (1935); West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63,
67-77 (1935); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 292 U.S. 398, 404-14 (1934);
Central Ky. Natural Gas Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 290 U.S. 264, 275 (1933).
70. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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due process to assess the substantive fairness of government action. The
Court did not verbally distinguish between procedural and substantive
due process during the Lochner era," and some of its due process deci-
sions are difficult to classify under these concepts. In the vast majority of
cases discussed and cited below, however, the Court used the term "due
process," identified some asserted deprivation of liberty or property, and
applied some kind of substantive review to the challenged law. In the
relatively few cases that did not explicitly rely on due process, the
Court's decision usually followed or resembled certain specific decisions
of the kind just described.
A. The Main Classes of Substantive Due Process Cases
During the Lochner era, the cases employing the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments' Due Process Clauses to evaluate the substance of
government action were of various kinds. Many of these decisions used
due process to advance values that either are identified with other spe-
cific provisions of the Constitution, or at least are extraneous to due pro-
cess. Examples include decisions incorporating the First and Sixth
Amendments within Fourteenth Amendment due process, 2 as well as due
process cases employing Contract Clause reasoning, 3 fusing due process
and burden-on-commerce rationales,"4 and adopting Takings Clause
tests. 5 Except for the regulated industries cases discussed immediately
below, this article does not discuss situations where due process was
used to advance values whose real constitutional home is elsewhere.76
Instead, it focuses on decisions that promote values more or less intrinsic
71. Wayne McCormack, Economic Substantive Due Process and the Right of Livelihood, 82
KY. LJ. 397, 406 (1993) (explaining that no member of the Court used the phrase "procedural due
process" until 1934 or the phrase "substantive due process" until 1948). Of course, the Court granted
many procedural due process claims during the Lochner era. See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1062-63
& n.60.
72. E.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 63-73 (1932) (involving the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707-23 (1931) (involving the First
Amendment freedom of the press); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368-70 (1931) (involving
the First Amendment freedom of speech). For several other such cases, see Phillips, supra note 41, at
1065 n.68.
73. E.g., Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441-48 (1932); Missouri, Kan. & Tex. Ry. Co. v.
Oklahoma, 271 U.S. 303, 306-10 (1926). See Phillips, supra note 41, at 1066 n.70 (providing a fuller
list of such cases).
74. E.g., Alpha Portland Cement Co. v. Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 216-20 (1925) (striking
down a state excise tax on foreign corporations), overruled by Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 249-62 (1911) (striking down a
state law forbidding foreign corporations from building pipelines across highways and using them to
transport natural gas outside the state); Phillips, supra note 41, at 1067 n.74 (presenting additional
cases on the blending of due process and burden-on-commerce theories).
75. See Delaware, Lackawanna, & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182, 193-95
(1928); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 412-16 (1922); Phillips, supra note 41, at
1065 n.65.
76. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text for additional examples of such cases.
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to due process: most importantly, the protection of liberty and property
against arbitrary government action.
1. Utility Rates and Utility Regulation
One reason why this article ignores the "incorporation" cases just
discussed is that, for the most part, these cases do not trigger the standard
criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process discussed earlier. But
one conspicuous exception to this generalization deserves discussion in
any treatment of the old Court's substantive due process decisions. This
is the sizable group of due process/takings cases assessing rates and other
regulations of railroads and other businesses affected with a public inter-
est.
In Munn v. Illinois,' decided in 1876, the Supreme Court upheld a
state law regulating the rates charged by grain elevators. 8 Munn can and
has been read as affirming that the states have considerable power to
regulate businesses "affected with a public interest."'  Among the busi-
nesses traditionally so classified are railroads, electric utilities, gas utili-
ties, street railways, telephone companies, and water utilities.' During
the latter part of the nineteenth century, the Court began to place some
substantive restrictions on the states' rate-making powers.' It did so un-
der due process tests containing a significant admixture of Takings
Clause criteria. 2 This process culminated in the Court's 1898 decision in
77. 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
78. Munn, 94 U.S. at 135-36.
79. See id. at 125-36. For further discussion of Munn and the affected-with-a-public-interest
doctrine, see Walton H. Hamilton, Affectation with Public Interest, 39 YALE LJ. 1089 (1930); Breck
P. McAllister, Lord Hale and Business Affected with a Public Interest, 43 HARv. L. REv. 759
(1930). Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531-39 (1934), is generally regarded as marking the
doctrine's demise. See PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 38, at 82-83.
80. WRIGHT, supra note 13, at 156. See also Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534-40 (1923) (containing Chief Justice Taft's attempt to define the classes
of businesses affected with a public interest).
81. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy
over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 199-223 (1984).
82. For example, three 1890s decisions quoted with approval Railroad Comm'n Cases, 116
U.S. 307, 331 (1886), in which the Court declared the states' inability to "do that which in law
amounts to a taking of private property for public use without just compensation, or without due
process of law." Covington & L. Turnpike Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 593 (1896); Reagan v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 398 (1894); Chicago, Milwaukee, & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418, 456 (1890). In Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), discussed below, one
of the Court's inquiries was whether the challenged rates were "so unreasonably low as to deprive
the carrier of its property without such compensation as the Constitution secures, and therefore
without due process of law." Id. at 526.
In 1897, moreover, the Court explicitly made it a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process for a state to take property without just compensation. See Chicago, Burlington & Quincy
R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897), as interpreted by ELY, supra note 7, at 91. Whether
this amounts to the Takings Clause's incorporation within Fourteenth Amendment due process is
unclear. On the conceptual confusion between substantive due process and the Takings Clause
around this time, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-
1910, at 104 (1995) [hereinafter ELY, CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER].
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Smyth v. Ames,"3 which affirmed judicial power to review the reasonable-
ness of rate regulations while striking down the challenged railroad rates
on combined due process-takings grounds."
For the forty-odd years following Smyth v. Ames," Christopher
Wolfe once observed, the Court "became a kind of Super-Railroad-Rate-
Commission" that was "knee-deep in the business of setting railroad
rates." Wolfe exaggerated only slightly; indeed, the Court's mandate
extended beyond railroad rates to include water, gas, electric, and tele-
phone rates, as well as street railway fares. Until the early 1940s, it used
due process to strike down rate decisions that denied railroads and vari-
ous public utilities a reasonable rate of return; the theory was that by
undercompensating these businesses for the use of their property, exces-
sively low rates deprived them of that property without just compensa-
tion.'
In order to make such determinations, the Court had to both value
the company's property and establish a fair rate of return on that value.'
On slightly over thirty occasions during the period 1902-1932, it held or
assumed that state or federal rate orders took property without due proc-
ess." This compares with a bit more than half as many decisions up-
holding rate orders.'
83. 169 U.S. 466,522-50 (1898).
84. Ames, 169 U.S. at 522-50.
85. The style of review set in motion by Smyth v. Ames is generally regarded as having ended
with Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944). See, e.g., ELY, supra
note 7, at 130; PIERCE & GELLHORN, supra note 38, at 98-99.
86. CHISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REvIEw 151 (1986).
87. "The established principle is that ... the due process clauses . . . safeguard private
property against a taking for public use without just compensation .... [W]here by legislation
prescribing rates or charges the use of the property is taken, just compensation assured by these
constitutional provisions is a reasonable rate of return upon that value." West v. Chesapeake &
Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S. 662,671 (1935).
88. See, e.g., PIERCE & GEa.LiORN, supra note 38, at 95-98.
89. Railroad Comrn'n v. Maxcy, 282 U.S. 249, 250-51 (1931) (water rates); United Rys. &
Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249-54 (1930) (street railway rates); Denny v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. 276 U.S. 97, 101-04 (1928) (telephone rates); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Public
Utils. Comm'n, 274 U.S. 344, 350-52 (1927) (railroad rates); Ottinger v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co.,
272 U.S. 579, 580-81 (1926) (gas rates); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400, 410-21
(1926) (water rates); Patterson v. Mobile Gas Co., 271 U.S. 131, 134-35 (1926) (gas rates); Board of
Pub. Util. Comm'rs v. New York Tel. Co., 271 U.S. 23, 31-32 (1926) (telephone rates); Smith v.
Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 270 U.S. 587, 590-92 (1926) (telephone rates); Banton v. Belt Line Ry., 268
U.S. 413, 419-25 (1925) (street railway fares); Northern Pac. Ry. v. Department of Pub. Works, 268
U.S. 39, 42-45 (1925) (railroad rates); Ohio Utils. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 359, 362-
64 (1925) (railroad rates); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 265 U.S. 403,
405-16 (1924) (gas rights); Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679, 684-95 (1923) (water rights); Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 287-89 (1923) (telephone rates); Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262
U.S. 43, 50-51 (1923) (telephone rates); City of Paducah v. Paducah Ry., 261 U.S. 267, 275 (1923)
(electric street car fares); City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 259 U.S. 318, 321-25
(1922) (telephone rates); Newton v. Consolidated Gas Co., 258 U.S. 165, 174-78 (1922) (gas rates);
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Also struck down as unconstitutional deprivations of property dur-
ing the Lochner era were sovereign commands that a regulated firm un-
dertake some burdensome or expensive act without compensation. For
example, in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Nebraska,' the Court con-
sidered a due process challenge to a Nebraska statute requiring that, at a
grain elevator's request but at its own expense, a railroad must construct
and maintain a side track to the elevator.' Writing for a seven-two Court
majority striking down the statute, Justice Holmes93 first observed that it
forced the railroad to incur expenses without compensation and therefore
took the railroad's property. Then, after admitting that the states can re-
strict property rights under the police power, Holmes declared that "there
are constitutional limits to what can be required of [railroad] owners un-
Vandalia R.R. v. Schnull, 255 U.S. 113, 118-22 (1921) (railroad rates); Groesbeck v. Duluth, S.
Shore & Ad. Ry., 250 U.S. 607, 611-15 (1919) (railroad rates); Detroit United Ry., v. City of
Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-37 (1919) (street railway fares); City & County of Denver v. Denver
Union Water Co., 246 U.S. 178, 185-94 (1919) (water rates); Rowland v. Boyle, 244 U.S. 106, 107-
11 (1917) (railroad rates); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Conley, 236 U.S. 605, 608-14 (1915) (railroad
rates); Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. McCue, 236 U.S. 585, 595-605 (1915) (railroad
rates); San Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation Co. v. County of Stanislaus, 233 U.S. 454,
458-61 (1914) (water rates); The Missouri Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 474, 507-09 (1913) (railroad rates);
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 433-73 (1913) (railroad rates); see also Chicago, Rock
Island, & Pac. Ry. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80, 96-100 (1931) (striking down ICC order regarding
charges for switching cars between railroads); City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co.,
255 U.S. 547, 555-58 (1921) (assuming confiscatory nature of rates and holding that government
and utility had not made contract on this subject); Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton, 255
U.S. 539, 542 (1921) (stating that confiscatory rates "cannot be enforced unless they are secured by
a contract obligation"). For some additional rate cases occuring before and after the 1902-1932
period, see supra note 69.
90. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hyde, 275 U.S. 440, 446-48 (1928) (insurance rates); Lincoln Gas &
Elec. Light Co. v. City of Lincoln, 250 U.S. 256, 266-69 (1919) (gas rates); Pennsylvania R.R. v.
Towers, 245 U.S. 6, 8-17 (1917) (railroad rates); Damell v. Edwards, 244 U.S. 564, 568-70 (1917)
(railroad rates); Newark Natural Gas & Fuel Co. v. City of Newark, 242 U.S. 405, 407-09 (1917)
(gas rates); Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines, 238 U.S. 153, 157, 162-73 (1915) (gas
rates); Wood v. Vandalia R.R., 231 U.S. 1, 3-8 (1913) (railroad rates); Mayor & Alderman of
Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co., 212 U.S. 1, 6-7, 15-19 (1909) (water rates); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. Florida ex rel. Ellis, 203 U.S. 261,268-70 (1906) (railroad rates); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v.
Florida ex rel. Ellis, 203 U.S. 256, 259-60 (1906) (railroad rates); County of Stanislaus v. San
Joaquin & King's River Canal & Irrigation Co., 192 U.S. 201, 213-17 (1904) (water rates); San
Diego Land & Town Co. v. Jasper, 189 U.S. 439, 441-47 (1903) (water rates); Minneapolis & St.
Louis R.R. v. Minnesota, 186 U.S. 257, 264-69 (1902) (railroad rates); see also Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 258 U.S. 234, 237-39 (1922) (holding commission order reducing gas bills
due to gas company's poor service does not violate due process); Producers' Transp. Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 251 U.S. 228, 229-32 (1920) (holding oil pipeline is devoted to public use and hence state
can regulate its rates); Union Dry Goods Co. v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Corp., 248 U.S. 372, 374-77
(1919) (rejecting a consumer's challenge to a commission order raising electric rates); cf. The New
England Div. Case, 261 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1923) (upholding ICC regulation of railroad rates);
O'Keefe v. United States, 240 U.S. 294,304 (1916) (upholding ICC regulation of railroad rates).
91. 217 U.S. 196 (1910).
92. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 205-08.
93. For a brief summary of the many cases in which Holmes participated in Lochner Court
decisions striking down government action on substantive due process grounds, see Phillips, supra
note 41, at 1083-86. On Holmes's progressive reputation, see G. Edward White, The Canonization of
Holmes and Brandeis: Epistemology and Judicial Reputations, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 576 (1995).
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der either the police power or any other ostensible justification for taking
such property away.""9 In fact, he continued, the statute would offend due
process even if it applied only when a grain elevator made a reasonable
demand for a side track." This, Holmes said, "still ... requires too much.
Why should the railroads pay for what, after all, are private connections?
We see no reason." During the years 1902 to 1932, the Court struck
down twelve other laws of this kind on due process grounds.97 But here,
unlike the rate cases, the decisions upholding such laws were over twice
as numerous. Many such cases involved commission orders," somewhat
94. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 206.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 207.
97. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha Ry. v. Holmberg, 282 U.S. 162, 166-67 (1930)
(striking down order that railroad install underground pass to connect two portions of farmer's farm);
Great N. Ry. v. Cahill, 253 U.S. 71, 73-77 (1920) (striking down order for railroad to install scales at
its stockyard); Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 251 U.S. 396, 398-400 (1920) (striking
down order to operate narrow-gauge railroad at a loss); City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Gas &
Elec. Corp., 251 U.S. 32, 37-40 (1919) (striking down order that electric company remove its poles
and property so that city could build its own system); Mississippi R.R. Comm'n v. Mobile & Ohio
R.R., 244 U.S. 388, 393-96 (1917) (striking down order that financially distressed railroad restore
six passenger trains to service); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S.
491, 497-502 (1915) (striking down statute requiring that railroad not let down upper berth in
sleeping cars before berth actually sold); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm'n, 238 U.S. 340, 345-47 (1915) (striking down order for railroad to install scale at its
stockyards); South Covington & Cincinnati St. Ry. v. City of Covington, 235 U.S. 537, 548-49
(1915) (striking down regulation that temperature of railroad cars never should fall below 50
degrees); Washington ex rel. Oregon R.R. & Navigation v. Fairchild, 224 U.S. 510, 527-33 (1912)
(striking down order that tracks of competing railroads be connected at various points); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. v. Central Stock Yards Co., 212 U.S. 132, 143-45 (1909) (striking down
constitutional provision compelling railroad to deliver cars to, and accept cars from, other railroads);
Cleveland Elec. Ry. v. City of Cleveland, 204 U.S. 116, 142 (1907) (striking down compelled
transfer of street railway's rails, poles, and appliances to another street railway after termination of
first railway's franchise); see also Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 235-41 (1904)
(striking down arbitrary ordinance forbidding construction of gas works that city previously granted
company right to build). For one such case occurring after 1932, see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas
Utils. Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 68-81 (1937).
98. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n, 283 U.S. 380, 394-97 (1931)
(upholding state commission order requiring interstate railroads to build passenger station in Los
Angeles); New York ex rel. Woodhaven Gaslight Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 269 U.S. 244, 245-
46, 248-49 (1925) (upholding commission order requiring gas company to extend its service to new
territories); Western & At. R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 267 U.S. 493, 496-98 (1925) (upholding
commission order requiring railroad to continue to furnish switching service to a shipper on an
established industrial siding); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Bourland, 267 U.S. 330, 332-33
(1925) (upholding city commission's refusal to allow street railway to abandon part of one of its
lines); United States v. New River Co., 265 U.S. 533, 542 (1924) (upholding ICC order regarding
distribution of coal from mines by carriers); Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 265 U.S.
70, 74-75 (1924) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to furnish facilities for shippers,
including a crossing, at a siding); Lake Erie & W. R.R. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 249 U.S. 422, 424-
25 (1919) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to restore a siding); Chicago & N.W. Ry.
v. Ochs, 249 U.S. 416, 418-22 (1919) (upholding commission order requiring railroad to alter and
extend a side track to a manufacturing plant); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minneapolis
Civic & Commerce Ass'n, 247 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1918) (upholding commission order that two
railroads owning a third railroad charge shippers the same rates over the third railroad's tracks that
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fewer concerned ordinances,w and in a relatively small number a statute's
constitutionality was at issue."
they charge over their own tracks); New York ex rel. New York & Queens Gas Co. v. McCall, 245
U.S. 345, 348-51 (1917) (upholding commission order requiring gas company to extend its service
area; procedural and substantive due process); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 242
U.S. 603, 606-08 (1917) (upholding order that railroad begin passenger service on a branch line);
Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239 U.S. 277, 280-83 (1915) (upholding commission order to railroad to
double track a portion of its line); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 236 U.S. 615,
630-34 (1915) (upholding commission order that two railroads physically connect their tracks);
Wadley S. Ry. v. Georgia, 235 U.S. 651, 658-59 (1915) (upholding commission order requiring
railroad to cease demanding prepayment from one carrier, but not from another); Chicago,
Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Iowa, 233 U.S. 334, 344-45 (1914) (upholding commission order
requiring railroad to accept coal cars from other railroads and transport them as directed); Grand
Trunk Ry. v. Michigan R.R. Comm'n, 231 U.S. 457, 463-73 (1913) (upholding commission order
that interstate railroads use their intracity tracks for the interchange of intrastate traffic); Missouri
Pac. Ry. v. Kansas ex reL Taylor, 216 U.S. 262, 273-83 (1910) (upholding commission order that
railroad institute passenger service between two points); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. North Carolina
Corp. Comm'n, 206 U.S. 1, 19-27 (1907) (upholding railroad commission order that railroad arrange
through service between two points); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois ex rel. Drainage
Comm'rs, 200 U.S. 561, 581-95 (1906) (upholding drainage commission order that railroad remove
bridge over stream); New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm'n, 197 U.S. 453, 460-62 (1905)
(upholding drainage commission order that gas company change location of gas pipes to
accommodate a new drainage system).
99. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 281 U.S. 682, 686-87 (1930)
(upholding ordinance requiring street railway to remove viaduct and construct double tracks across
railroad tracks); Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. White, 278 U.S. 456, 458-60 (1929)
(upholding ordinance requiring railway to keep a flagman on duty on every street crossed by its
tracks); Sullivan v. City of Shreveport, 251 U.S. 169, 171-73 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring
that street cars be operated by a motor-man and a conductor); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of
Sacramento, 251 U.S. 22, 25-26 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring street railway to sprinkle
streets near its tracks); Denver & Rio Grande R.R. v. City & County of Denver, 250 U.S. 241,
243-45 (1919) (upholding ordinance requiring railroad to remove track crossing crowded city
thoroughfare); Columbus Ry., Power & Light Co. v. City of Columbus, 249 U.S. 399, 407-14 (1919)
(upholding ordinance requiring street railway to continue to operate at unremunerative rates for
which it had previously contracted with city); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. City of Omaha, 235 U.S. 121,
127-31 (1914) (upholding ordinance requiring that railroad construct viaduct over streets); Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 555-62 (1914) (upholding ordinance regulating
trains and their tracks within a municipality); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. City of
Minneapolis, 232 U.S. 430, 437-42 (1914) (upholding city's condemnation of a portion of railroad
right-of-way and compelling railroad to build a bridge over that portion at its own expense, without
compensating railroad); Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 229 U.S. 39, 45-46 (1913) (upholding
ordinance compelling street railway to remove its tracks and property from the streets upon city's
failure to renew franchise); West Chicago St. R.R. v. Illinois ex rel. City of Chicago, 201 U.S. 506,
522-27 (1906) (upholding ordinance requiring street railway to lower tunnel beneath a river).
100. Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249, 254-56 (1931) (upholding state statutes
regulating the size of freight train and switching crews); Fort Smith Light & Traction Co. v. Board
of Improvement, 274 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1927) (upholding state statute requiring that street railway
pave street between its tracks); Great N. Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel. Village of Clara City, 246 U.S.
434, 436-39 (1918) (upholding state statute requiring railroad to construct sidewalk across right of
way); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240 U.S. 518, 520-21 (1916) (upholding state
statute requiring full switching crews on railroads exceeding 100 miles in length); Chicago & Alton
R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67, 76-78 (1915) (upholding state statute requiring outlets for water
across rights of way); Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. v. Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse
Comm'n, 193 U.S. 53, 64-65 (1904) (upholding state statute requiring railroads to establish stations
at all villages and boroughs on their roads).
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2. Liability and Damages
In addition to the regulations just discussed, the states often sub-
jected railroads and other carriers to enhanced civil liability and damages
for injuries and other losses connected with the services they provided.
Such statutes occasionally came under substantive due process attack
during the first quarter of this century. On five occasions, the Court
struck down the challenged measure. ' In St. Louis, Iron Mountain, &
Southern Railway Co. v. Wynne,'" for instance, a unanimous Court re-
jected an Arkansas statute imposing double liability plus attorney's fees
on railroads that refused a demand for compensation for the killing of
livestock. 3 The law, it said, was an arbitrary exercise of government
power and a denial of due process because, by imposing onerous penal-
ties for a railroad's refusal to pay extravagant demands, it deprived the
railroad of property merely because it exercised an undoubted right.'" As
if to signal the Court's ambivalence about these provisions, though, it
distinguished Wynne two years later in a case involving the same Arkan-
sas statute. 5 The Court also upheld a few other state laws imposing spe-
cial liability and/or damages on railroads'" and other businesses.'" In two
101. Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Nye-Schneider-Fowler Co., 260 U.S. 35, 46-48 (1922) (striking
down a statute allowing recovery of attorney's fees against carrier upon appeal, under certain
circumstances); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Polt, 232 U.S. 165, 167-68 (1914) (striking
down a statute imposing double liability on a railroad unless it pays the full judgment within 60 days
from notice); Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Kennedy, 232 U.S. 626, 627 (1914) (following
Polt); Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Tucker, 230 U.S. 340, 346-51 (1913) (striking down civil liquidated
damages provision for violating rate schedule for shipping petroleum products); St. Louis, Iron
Mountain & S. Ry. v. Wynne, 224 U.S. 354, 358-61 (1912) (striking down a statute giving double
liablity plus attorney's fees to owner of livestock allegedly killed by railroad, if railroad refused
demand for compensation).
102. 224 U.S. 354(1912).
103. Wynne, 224 U.S. at 359-61.
104. Id. at 359-60.
105. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Anderson, 233 U.S. 325 (1914). The basis of the distinction was that
in Wynne, the plaintiff initially recovered less than the amount of his demand and then was awarded
over twice this amount under the statute. Id. at 328. This meant that Wynne only held the statute
unconstitutional under the facts presented there. Id. at 329-30.
106. Southern Ry. v. Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 320-22 (1922) (upholding state law requiring
railroads to pay or reject claims for loss or damage to freight within 90 days, or else suffer liability
for such claims); St. Louis, Iron Mountain, & S. Ry. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 66-67 (1919)
(upholding as not arbitrary or unreasonable a state statute imposing civil penalties on railroads
whose passenger fees exceed those set by state law); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Glenn, 239 U.S.
388, 392-94 (1915) (upholding state statute making shipping carrier liable for certain damage to
shipped property even if the loss occurred while the goods were under another carrier's control,
where the defendant had tried to contract out of this liability); Yazoo & Miss. Valley R.R. v. Jackson
Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 218-20 (1912) (upholding state law penalizing common carriers for
failing to settle claims for lost or damaged freight within a reasonable time period, the penalty being
in addition to actual damages).
107. Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell, 274 U.S. 112, 114-17 (1927) (upholding a state
law allowing imposition of punitive damages against employers for deaths caused by the negligence
of their employees); Eiger v. Garrity, 246 U.S. 97, 102-04 (1918) (upholding a state statute allowing
wife whose means of support is damaged by sale of liquor to her husband to recover against tavern,
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of these cases, liability was imposed even though the defendant had tried
to contractually disclaim it."
In their remedial aspects, the preceding cases bear some resem-
blance to the Court's recent decision in BMW of North America v.
Gore," where it used due process to strike down a $2 million state puni-
tive damages award on what looked like substantive grounds."0 But while
most liability and damages determinations probably deserve to be called
substantive, the same may not be true of another matter that sometimes
preoccupied the old Court: evidentiary presumptions. On the one hand,
the evidentiary nature of these presumptions suggests procedure."' But
the old Court used a rational basis test to determine whether they satisfy
due process,"2 and such means-ends tests normally are a tool for substan-
tive evaluation. In any event, the Court struck down at least two pre-
sumptions during the Lochner era,"3 while upholding a slightly greater
number.""
3. The Tax Cases
In addition to the "incorporation" cases discussed earlier,"5 state tax
legislation gave rise to another group of decisions in which the Lochner
Court used due process to advance values whose original constitutional
home is elsewhere. At least one of these tax cases basically was a Con-
and creating a lien against the owner of the premises to enforce the judgment); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Commercial Milling Co., 218 U.S. 406, 421 (1910) (validating a state statute imposing
liability for misdelivery of telegram); Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 67-70
(1910) (finding constitutional a state statute criminalizing the cutting of timber on state lands and
imposing multiple damages therefor, even if the cutting was involuntary); Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v.
Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111-12 (1909) (affirming penalties for a violation of state antitrust statute).
108. Glenn, 239 U.S. at 391; Western Union, 218 U.S. at 408.
109. 116S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
110. In Gore, Justice Stevens's opinion for the Court did not use the terms "procedural due
process" or "substantive due process." However, by basing the decision on the state's failure to
provide fair notice about the penalties BMW could expect for its behavior, Stevens might be thought
to have been applying the former. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1598. But the criteria he used to determine
whether the state provided such notice belie this assumption. These criteria were: (1) the
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm
suffered by the claimant and the size of the punitive damages award; and (3) the size of the award
compared to state civil penalties in comparable cases. Id. at 1598-1603. These criteria appear to be
substantive, and the Court did little to explain how the state's failure to meet the first and second of
them amounted to inadequate notice. Even if the state had given BMW all the notice in the world,
furthermore, it still might have violated due process under these criteria. As if to underline these
points, both dissents in Gore characterized the Court's opinion as an application of substantive due
process. Id. at 1611 (Scalia, J., dissenting); id. at 1617 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
111. Indeed, one of these cases explicitly stated that the presumption in question involved a rle
of evidence rather than a substantive right. Reitler v. Harris, 223 U.S. 437 , 441-42 (1912).
112. See Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 5 (1929) (stating that a factual presumption "is valid if
there is a rational connection between what is proved and what is to be inferred").
113. Western & Atl. R.R. v. Henderson, 279 U.S. 639,642-44(1929); Manley, 279 U.S. at 5-7.
114. Ferry v. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88, 93-95 (1928); Reitler, 223 U.S. at 441-42; Mobile, Jackson,
& Kansas City R.R. v. Turnipseed, 219 U.S. 35,42-44 (1910).
115. See supra notes 72-74, 77-92 and accompanying text.
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tract Clause decision,"' several more essentially used burden-on-
commerce analysis,'1 and a much larger group involved more general
federalism-related concerns."' Like their earlier counterparts, these cases
are of no concern to this article. Instead, I emphasize the many Lochner
era tax decisions that advance notions of fairness either intrinsic to due
process (e.g., nonarbitrariness), or at least not readily derivable from
some other constitutional provision.
Perhaps the largest group of such cases involved the assessments
made by state laws apportioning the costs of public improvements among
the private landowners most benefited by those improvements. As the
Court declared in a 1924 case,"9 the states may require that the cost of a
local public improvement be distributed over the lands particularly bene-
116. Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S. 582, 595-606 (1931) (holding that the application of an estate
tax to a succession under a trust created before passage of the tax violates due process and the
Contract Clause). This article does not consider cases upholding state tax laws that were challenged
on due process/Contract Clause grounds.
117. The cases striking down state tax laws on this basis generally involved state taxation of
foreign corporations. Cudahy Packing Co. v. Hinkle, 278 U.S. 460, 464-67 (1929) (striking down a
filing fee and license tax for out-of-state corporations); Alpha Portland Cement Co. v.
Massachusetts, 268 U.S. 203, 216-20 (1925) (invalidating a state excise tax on out-of-state
corporations); Wallace v. Hines, 253 U.S. 66, 67-70 (1920) (striking down'a tax on out-of-state
businesses); Union Tank Line v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 282-86 (1919) (holding invalid a tax on
railroad's rolling stock used in state); International Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S. 135, 142-
45 (1918) (striking down an excise tax on out-of-state corporations); Looney v. Crane Co., 245 U.S.
178, 187-91 (1917) (invalidating permit charges and franchise tax on foreign corporations); Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas ex rel. Coleman, 216 U.S. 1, 18-48 (1910) (striking down a law
conditioning out-of-state corporation's doing business on its paying a charter fee based on some
percentage of its authorized capital).
118. These cases mainly involved state power to tax out-of-state property, income, and
activities. As Benjamin Wright once remarked, they concerned "what is essentially one phase of
federalism.. . the relationship between state and state, or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say,
between state and property located in other states." WRiGrr, supra note 1,3, at 160. For a list of the
Lochner Court cases striking down state tax laws on these grounds, see Phillips, supra note 41, at
1067-68 & n.76. Impressionistically, I would say that the old Court's decisions upholding such laws
against such challenges outnumber the 23 cases cited in that note.
The article also does not consider a related group of cases with perhaps a greater claim to be
classified as substantive due process decisions. To a greater or lesser extent, each seems to resemble
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589-93 (1897) (striking down a state statute forbidding the
obtaining of marine insurance on in-state property from any carrier that had not complied with state
law). See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 433-36 (1926) (striking down a state
law that forbade any state-authorized insurance company from paying anyone not so authorized to
place insurance on in-state risks); St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 348-49
(1922) (invalidating a state statute that imposed a five percent tax on monies paid to insure in-state
property through an insurer that was not registered to do business within the state); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357, 367-77 (1918) (discussing Allgeyer while holding that a state
statute regarding insurance policies with unpaid premiums could not constitutionally control a
contract made out-of-state which asserted that it would be governed by another state's law). Tafoya
and St. Louis Cotton Compress apparently did not employ due process; the statute in Dodge,
however, was attacked on the theory that it denied freedom of contract. Dodge, 246 U.S. at 377. For
some related cases that also concern the permissible extraterritorial reach of state power, see Phillips,
supra note 41, at 1064 & n.63.
119. Kansas City S. Ry. v. Road Improvement Dist. No. 3,266 U.S. 379 (1924).
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fited thereby; and may make this distribution according to the property
value, the geographic area, or the benefits involved.2' "Only where the
legislative determination is palpably arbitrary, and therefore a plain
abuse of power," the Court continued, "can it be said to offend the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."' 2 ' The main abuse
presented by the three cases in which the Court struck down such as-
sessments over the period 1902-1932 was the imposition of liability on
landowners who either did not benefit from the improvement, or did not
benefit in proper proportion to their tax burden.'22 But the Court upheld at
least twice as many assessments during this period.' 3
The old Court also upheld various other state tax measures despite
claims that they offended due process. Some of these cases involved is-
sues of valuation or of property's susceptibility to taxation, 4 two in-
120. Kansas City S. Ry., 266 U.S. at 386.
121. Id.
122. See Standard Pipe Line Co. v. Miller County Highway & Bridge Dist., 277 U.S. 160, 161-
63 (1928) (declaring an assessment arbitrary because claimant received relatively little benefit from
the road financed by the assessment); Road Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 274 U.S.
188, 189-95 (1927) (concluding that amount assessed against railroad for road paralleling its tracks
exceeds benefit railroad received from the road); Myles Salt Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 239 U.S.
478, 479-85 (1916) (holding that a drainage district's taxation of claimant's land was
unconstitutional because that land did not benefit from the district's undertakings).
123. See Memphis & Charleston Ry. v. Pace, 282 U.S. 241, 246-49 (1931) (sustaining a road
tax's application to a railroad having part of its line and other property within the road district);
Kansas City S. Ry., 266 U.S. at 386-89 (upholding road assessment because, inter alia, benefits to
property owner may be matter of forecast and estimate, so long as not speculative); House v. Road
Improvement Dist. No. 2, 266 U.S. 175, 177-78 (1924) (rejecting as without merit a claim that an
assessment was arbitrary because the improvement could not benefit the claimant's lands, while
lands that were benefited were not assessed); Missouri Pac. R.R. v. Western Crawford Rd.
Improvement Dist., 266 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1924) (holding that apportionment of expenses associated
with discontinued road improvement district not invalid because it was based on assessed value of
property rather than benefit to property); Houck v. Little River Drainage Dist., 239 U.S. 254, 260-67
(1915) (upholding a tax on landowners within drainage district despite various substantive
objections); Phillip Wagner, Inc. v. Leser, 239 U.S. 207, 215-20 (1915) (rejecting challenges to an
assessment against landowners for resurfacing of highway); Briscoe v. Rudolph, 221 U.S. 547, 549-
51 (1911) (upholding against various substantive arguments assessment against property owner for
benefits from extension of District of Columbia street; syllabus suggests claims based on procedural
and substantive due process).
124. Salomon v. State Tax Comm'n, 278 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1929) (holding methods of valuing
contingent remainder in inheritance tax are consistent with due process); Baker v. Druesedow, 263
U.S. 137, 140 (1923) (holding that due process does not prevent state from taxing railroad's
intangible property, or from ascertaining property's value by subtracting value of tangible property
from value of all property); Southern Ry. v. Watts, 260 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1923) (rejecting claim that
valuations made in administration of state property tax violate due process; case seems to involve
mixture of procedural and substantive claims); Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U.S. 576, 587-90 (1914)
(stating that a levy on intrastate earnings of railroads does not deny due process on theory that
privilege tax cannot exceed value of privilege, because tax only caused hardship in isolated cases);
Paddell v. City of New York, 211 U.S. 446, 448-51 (1908) (holding that land subject to mortgage
can be taxed at full value).
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volved gasoline taxes,' one considered whether the challenged tax was
for a public purpose,' 26 and (like many of the assessments for improve-
ments) one concerned a claim that those subject to the tax did not benefit
from it.'" During the late 1920s and early 1930s, however, the old Court
struck down five federal tax provisions on due process grounds. Three
involved presumptions," one concerned a gift tax,2 9 and another assessed
against a husband a tax based on his income plus his wife's income."
Earlier, though, it had upheld a few miscellaneous federal tax
provisions.'
4. General Police Measures
The tax decisions excepted, most of the cases discussed thus far
involve applications of the police power. The police power, of course, is
the states' power to regulate to protect the public health, safety, morals,
and welfare. This section considers due process challenges to laws that
claim justification under one of these desiderata, and that do not fit
within one of the specific applications of the police power discussed in
other sections. The Lochner Court rejected over thirty such challenges
during the period 1902-1932, and granted relatively few.
One way to argue against the accusation that most Lochner era jus-
tices were knowing tools of business is to maintain that instead they were
across-the-board libertarians concerned with protecting both economic
and noneconomic rights. For example, the Bill of Rights' incorporation
within Fourteenth Amendment due process got its start during the 1920s,
the same decade in which substantive due process's kill ratio reached its
125. Pierce Oil Corp. v. Hopkins, 264 U.S. 137, 138-39 (1924) (upholding law requiring gas
stations to collect gas tax); Bowman v. Continental Oil Co., 256 U.S. 642, 649 (1921) (holding that
excise tax on sale of gasoline does not offend due process as applied to domestic sales).
126. Jones v. City of Portland, 245 U.S. 217, 220-25 (1917) (holding that a tax to create
municipal coal and fuel yard for sale to city's inhabitants is for a public purpose and therefore does
not violate due process).
127. Knights v. Jackson, 260 U.S. 12, 14-15 (1922) (rejecting claim that state's income tax
distribution to cities for increases in teacher salaries violated due process because it imposed a public
charge upon a special class of property and on persons not specially benefited by the resulting
outlay).
128. Handy v. Delaware Trust Co., 285 U.S. 352, 354-55 (1932); Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S.
312, 322-29 (1932); Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 239-40 (1926).
129. Untermyer v. Anderson, 276 U.S. 440,445-46 (1928).
130. Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206,214-18 (1931).
131. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 138-39 (1929) (noting that graduation and
exemption schemes in federal gift tax are consistent with due process); Barclay & Co. v. Edwards,
267 U.S. 442, 447-51 (1924) (holding that taxation of certain foreign corporations differently from
their U.S. counterparts in federal income tax does not violate the Fifth Amendment); La Belle Iron
Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377, 392-94 (1921) (finding no arbitrary discrimination and no
violation of Fifth Amendment due process in provisions of federal excess profits tax). None of these
cases formally incorporated equal protection standards within Fifth Amendment due process.
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peak.'32 More importantly, the 1920s witnessed two important substantive
due process decisions involving noneconomic rights. Meyer v.
Nebraska'" and Pierce v. Society of Sisters'"6 affirmed and protected par-
ents' substantive due process right to control the upbringing and educa-
tion of their children.' In Meyer, moreover, Justice McReynolds defined
due process liberty in broad terms:
Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily re-
straint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any
of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God ac-
cording to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.16
During the modem era, Meyer and Pierce provided some support and
inspiration for the modem constitutional right of privacy.'
37
But while this aspect of Lochner era substantive due process de-
serves emphasis, the old Court was not a consistent defender of "per-
sonal" or "lifestyle" rights during the first third of the century. This is
most evident in its substantive due process decisions regarding the regu-
lation of alcohol, where it invariably bowed to the Prohibition era zeit-
geist. ' Also displaying an antilibertarian spirit were four old Court deci-
sions that upheld state laws requiring able bodied men to work on public
132. See supra notes 9, 72-75 and accompanying text. However, one might say that the
incorporation process really began around the turn of the century with the inclusion of Takings
Clause standards within Fourteenth Amendment due process. See supra note 82.
133. 262 U.S. 390, 399-403 (1923) (striking down a state statute that forbade the teaching of
any subject in any language besides English in both public and private schools, and that also forbade
the teaching of any such language as a language to any student who had not completed the eighth
grade); see also Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404, 409-11 (1923) (striking down several similar statutes
on the authority of Meyer).
134. 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (striking down a state law requiring that all students between
the ages of eight and 16 attend a public school).
135. In Pierce, the Court said that "[ulnder the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it
entirely plain that the [law at issue] unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35
(citation omitted). Actually, though, Justice McReynolds's Meyer opinion emphasized a panoply of
rights, including a language teacher's right to teach a particular language to children, the parents'
right to retain him to do so, a pupil's right to acquire knowledge, and the parents' right to control
their child's education. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 400-01.
136. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
137. E.g., GuNTHER, supra note 12, at 446, 491-92.
138. See Crane v. Campbell, 245 U.S. 304, 306-08 (1917) (upholding a state statute forbidding,
inter alia, the personal possession of liquor); James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242
U.S. 311, 319-20 (1917) (upholding a state prohibition law that, inter alia, forbade the importation
of liquor by carriers); Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U.S. 700, 706-07 (1914) (upholding a local option
law regarding the sale of liquor within a county against various claims that it deprived brewers and
merchants of various property rights); Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U.S. 192, 199-205
(1912) (upholding state statute forbidding the sale of malt liquor).
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roads,' 9 banning fraternities in state schools,'" prohibiting billiard halls,''
and attacking gambling.' 2 Last but hardly least, we have Buck v. Bell,'
in which six Justices joined Justice Holmes's opinion upholding a state
statute that permitted the sterilization of certain mental defectives.'"
As the term might be defined today, I suppose, the preceding deci-
sions are anything but progressive. At the time they were decided, how-
ever, these cases attracted few objections from progressive heroes such
as Holmes and Brandeis.' 5 The same pattern of deference continues
when we move from cases involving traditional morality to those con-
cemed with health and safety. Indeed, one of these decisions upheld the
challenged law despite the majority's apparent disbelief in its health ra-
tionale. In Laurel Hill Cemetery v. City and County of San Francisco,'"
the Court considered a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an ordinance
forbidding burial of the dead within a city and its surrounding county. 7
The challenger's main argument in this apparent substantive due process
case was that the law's asserted health rationale lacked scientific support
and was based on superstition." Without ever challenging the substance
of this argument, however, Justice Holmes's opinion for a unanimous
Court upheld the ordinance. It did so partly on grounds of deference to
the legislature.' 9 Furthermore, Holmes opined, "[tiradition and the habits
of the community count for more than logic.""
It is hardly surprising that Holmes would write as he did in Laurel
Hill. More interesting for present purposes is the fact that eight other
justices joined his highly deferential opinion. And if the old Court was
prepared to uphold laws whose health and safety rationale was feeble, we
should not be surprised that it routinely rejected substantive due process
challenges where that rationale was stronger. In at least three cases, for
example, the Court upheld laws requiring particular methods for dispos-
139. Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 329, 333 (1916).
140. Waugh v. Board of Trustees, 237 U.S. 589, 593-97 (1915).
141. Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623,628-30 (1912).
142. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224-25 (1905). Among other things, this law allowed the
loser of a wager to recover his loss from the winner. To enforce any judgment received, moreover,
the law gave the loser a lien against the winner's property and also against the building in which the
wager occurred (if the owner knowingly permitted gambling to occur there). Id. at 216-17.
143. 274 U.S. 200(1927).
144. The law was challenged on both due process and equal protection grounds. Buck, 274 U.S.
at 205. The substantive due process discussion occurs near the conclusion of Justice Holmes's
opinion. Id. at 207.
145. Of the cases cited supra in notes 138-43, the only dissent by Holmes or Brandeis was
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311, 332 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
146. 216 U.S. 358 (1910).
147. Laurel Hill Cemetery, 216 U.S. at 364-66.
148. id. at 364-65.
149. Id. at 365.
150. Id. at 366.
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ing of garbage and other waste.'"' In two others, it upheld laws regulating
the storage of flammable fluids.' Other unsuccessful challenges to
health and safety measures involved laws requiring vaccination,' in-
demnifying property owners for damages from mobs and riots,'4 requir-
ing that toll roads be kept in repair,' requiring electric headlights on
trains,'" forbidding the emission of dense smoke in certain areas of a
city,'" and requiring that diseased trees be cut down.' 8
As the last example suggests, the health and safety cases shade off
by degrees into a series of cases regulating the use of land to promote
aesthetic or quality of life values. Here too the old Court invariably up-
held the challenged regulations. The laws in question restricted or limited
the locale of activities such as the erection or maintenance of stables,' 9
the herding and grazing of sheep,'" the manufacture of bricks,'6 ' and the
placement of billboards.' 2 A somewhat distinguishable trio of cases up-
held laws aimed at the conservation of resources such as natural gas,' 3
mineral waters containing carbonic gas,"6 and the supply of game.' 5
151. Hutchinson v. City of Valdosta, 227 U.S. 303, 307-08 (1913) (upholding an ordinance
requiring people near sewer lines to install water closets and to connect with the sewer); Gardner v.
Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 330-33 (1905) (rejecting a challenge to an ordinance requiring all
occupants of buildings to place waste in a suitable watertight vessel and to place it where it could be
picked up, and letting the city give some party the exclusive right to collect the waste); California
Reduction Co. v. Sanitary Reduction Works, 199 U.S. 306, 317-25 (1905) (upholding an ordinance
requiring the cremation of garbage and refuse at a designated place).
152. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Marysville, 279 U.S. 582, 586 (1929); Pierce Oil Corp. v. City
of Hope, 248 U.S. 498, 499-501 (1919).
153. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 12-13, 37-39 (1905).
154. City of Chicago v. Sturges, 222 U.S. 313,321-22 (1911).
155. Norfolk & Suburban Turnpike Co. v. Virginia, 225 U.S. 264,270-71 (1912).
156. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Georgia, 234 U.S. 280, 287-89 (1914).
157. Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 489-92 (1916).
158. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 277-81 (1928).
159. Reinman v. City of Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 172, 177-80 (1915) (upholding an
ordinance forbidding livery stables within certain parts of a city); Fischer v. City of St. Louis, 194
U.S. 361, 362, 372 (1904) (rejecting a challenge to an ordinance forbidding erection of cow stables
and dairies).
160. Bown v. Walling, 204 U.S. 320, 320-21 (1907); Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311, 314, 317
(1907).
161. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 407-12 (1915) (upholding a law prohibiting the
manufacture of bricks within certain areas).
162. Thomas Cusak Co. v. City of Chicago, 242 U.S. 526, 529-31 (1917). This case did not
specifically use the words due process, but it did distinguish Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S.
137 (1912), which was a substantive due process case. Thomas Cusak Co., 242 U.S. at 531.
163. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300, 309-10, 323-24 (1920) (upholding a statute
forbidding, inter alia, various uses of natural gas without its heat being fully utilized).
164. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 76-78 (1911) (rejecting a challenge to
a statute regulating the pumping of mineral waters containing an excess of carbonic gas with the aim
of selling such gas as a separate commodity; aim of law is to preserve the common pool).
165. New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31, 36-37, 40 (1908) (upholding a statute
prohibiting the possession of game during the closed season for such game, as applied to game killed
in England).
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Some of the previous cases might better be described as land-use
decisions. In any event, the old Court's substantive due process cases
included a number of decisions which clearly deserve that label. Here,
the Court sometimes used due process to strike down the regulation. In
two of these cases, the offending law effectively gave one set of private
landowners control over the uses to which others' land could be put, did
so in a fairly standardless fashion, and bore no obvious relation to any
police-power purpose. Eubank v. City of Richmond"M struck down an
ordinance requiring that, at the request of two-thirds of the property
owners on a street, the city set a specified building line on that street.'6"
And Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge" invalidated
an ordinance conditioning construction of a home for the aged poor on
the consent of two-thirds of the property owners living within four hun-
dred feet of the planned home."M Involving much the same themes was
Buchanan v. Warley,"70 where the Court struck down an ordinance whose
practical effect was to block the sale of a house to a black person if over
half the property owners on the block were white.'7
Given decisions like these, one might expect that the old Court
would take a dim view of zoning. But its 1926 decision in Village of
Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 2 which upheld various portions of a subur-
ban zoning ordinance against a due process challenge, showed
otherwise.' To be sure, Justice Sutherland's opinion for a six to three
Court majority said that clearly arbitrary zoning provisions-those with-
out a substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare-would be invalidated."" And two years later, in Nectow v. City
of Cambridge,' the Court did strike down one classification within a
generally valid zoning scheme.' 6 One year earlier, however, it had up-
held two land-use regulations on the authority of Euclid.'" Five years
before Euclid, finally, it also had upheld wartime rent regulations in two
acrimonious five to four decisions.'
166. 226 U.S. 137 (1912).
167. Eubank, 226 U.S. at 143-44.
168. 278 U.S. 116 (1928).
169. Roberge, 278 U.S. at 120-23.
170. 245 U.S. 60(1917).
171. Buchanan, 245 U.S. at 73-82. The relevant portion of the ordinance made it unlawful for
any black person to move into and occupy any house located in any block in which the majority of
homes are owned by white people.
172. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
173. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 384-95.
174. Id. at 395.
175. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
176. Nectow, 277 U.S. at 187-89.
177. Gorieb v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 610 (1927) (upholding a setback provision); Zahn v. Board
of Pub. Works, 274 U.S. 325, 328 (1927) (upholding a zoning ordinance).
178. Block v. Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 154-58 (1921); Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman,
256 U.S. 170, 197-99 (1921).
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5. The Regulation of Business and Trade
In addition to the cases just discussed, the Lochner Court also up-
held a few general police power measures that are less easily
categorized.'" More importantly, cases involving some of the specific
police power purposes that organized the previous section can be classed
in other ways. Truck weight limits,8 for example, may be regarded as
public safety measures, or as regulations of business. Some measures that
are intended to promote the public health, furthermore, might also be
called consumer protection laws. During the period 1902-1932, the Court
sustained at least three consumer protection regulations against substan-
tive due process attacks.'8 ' In Weaver v. Palmer Brothers,'2 however, it
struck down a state law banning the use of "shoddy" in mattresses, pil-
lows, bolsters, feather beds, upholstered furniture, and so forth.'83 It did
so in part because the law could not be defended as a health measure.'"
Sometimes the public health might be promoted by labelling laws
requiring disclosure of the ingredients contained in food products. In a
1919 case, for instance, the Court upheld a state statute that mandated the
labelling of syrups and a description of their ingredients on the label.'
But some consumer disclosure laws mainly promote buyers' economic
interests, and the old Court upheld several measures of this kind as well.
Despite those laws' anticompetitive potential,'" for example, it rejected a
few substantive due process challenges to state antideception measures
requiring that products be described (or not described) in certain ways.'7
However, the old Court was less consistent in its treatment of laws regu-
179. Ten-ace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-18 (1923) (upholding a statute preventing aliens
who have not declared intention to become a U.S. citizen from taking or holding interests in land);
Nicchia v. New York, 254 U.S. 228, 230-31 (1920) (allowing a license fee for dog owners); Western
Turf Ass'n v. Greenberg, 204 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1907) (permitting a statute that prevented, with
some exceptions, places of public entertainment from forbidding entry to those over 21).
180. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932) (upholding weight limits for trucks
against a due process attack).
181. Pure Oil Co. v. Minnesota, 248 U.S. 158, 161-64 (1918) (upholding the validity of a law
requiring inspection of gasoline and illuminating oil before sale); Price v. Illinois, 238 U.S. 446,
451-53 (1915) (upholding a law forbidding sale of food preservatives containing boric acid); Adams
v. City of Milwaukee, 228 U.S. 572, 582-84 (1913) (upholding a portion of an ordinance regulating
the sale of milk that required nonconforming milk to be confiscated, forfeited, and destroyed).
182. 270 U.S. 402 (1926).
183. Weaver, 270 U.S. at 409, 412-15. "Shoddy is any material which has been spun into yam,
knit, or woven into fabric, and subsequently cut up, torn up, broken up, or ground up." Id.
184. Id. at 414.
185. Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427,431 (1919).
186. Laws restricting or regulating the sale of oleo, for instance, may well benefit producers of
butter. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 73-75.
187. Hutchinson Ice Cream Co. v. Iowa, 242 U.S. 153, 157-60 (1916) (upholding a state law
forbidding sale of "ice cream" that does not contain a certain percentage of butter fat); Capital City
Dairy Co. v. Ohio, 183 U.S. 238, 245-47 (1902) (upholding a law allowing manufacture and sale of
oleo so long as it was free of any coloring or ingredients that would make it appear to be butter); see
also Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U.S. 34, 38-43 (1907) (rejecting a challenge to a state statute
forbidding, inter alia, sale of merchandise bearing representation of the American flag).
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lating the packaging of consumer products. After upholding three such
measures approximately a decade earlier," in 1924 it struck down a state
statute regulating the weights at which bread loaves could be sold.'
Another way for government to protect consumers is to. directly
regulate the substantive terms of consumer contracts. Here, as one might
expect, the Lochner Court was more apt to strike down the challenged
regulation. As noted earlier, relatively few of its cases invalidating gov-
emment regulation expressly did so on the ground that the law restricted
freedom of contract.'" Nonetheless, several can be regarded as freedom
of contract cases in substance. The main examples are three well known
1920s decisions striking down laws fixing the prices of consumer goods
or services-Tyson & Brother v. Banton,'9' Ribnik v. McBride," and
Williams v. Standard Oil Co. 3 Technically, each involved a deprivation
of property, with one presenting a denial of contractual liberty as well.'
During roughly the same period that the Court decided Tyson, Ribnik,
and Williams, however, it sustained two federal price fixing measures
against due process attacks.'95 It also upheld a state law directly regulat-
ing a contract's nonprice terms. In Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v.
Jackson,'" the Court considered a measure giving purchasers of harvest-
ing and threshing machinery a reasonable time for inspection and a war-
ranty of fitness for the machinery's purposes, and forbidding disclaimers
of this implied warranty.'" After stating some bromides about freedom of
contract and its importance, ' Justice Butler's opinion for the Court up-
held the measure in terms almost indistinguishable from those used by
contemporary liberal judges. '
188. Armour & Co. v. North Dakota, 240 U.S. 510, 511, 516-17 (1916) (upholding a state law
requiring that lard be sold in containers holding a specified number of pounds, or whole multiples
thereof); Schmidinger v. City of Chicago, 226 U.S. 578, 584-85, 590 (1913) (upholding a state law
regulating sizes of bread loaves for sale); House v. Mayes, 219 U.S. 270, 277, 282-85 (1911)
(upholding a state law requiring grain traders to sell at actual weight).
189. Jay Bums Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504,513-17 (1924).
190. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
191. 273 U.S. 418, 429-45 (1927) (striking down a state law regulating the resale price of
theater tickets).
192. 277 U.S. 350, 355-59 (1928) (invalidating a state law regulating the fees charged by
employment agencies).
193. 278 U.S. 235,239-45 (1929) (striking down a state law fixing the retail price of gasoline).
194. Williams, 278 U.S. at 239 (property); Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 358 (property and freedom of
contract); Tyson, 273 U.S. at 429 ("[Rjight of the owner to fix a price at which his property shall be
sold or used is an inherent attribute of the property itself....").
195. Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420, 431, 437-39 (1930) (upholding
the regulation of fees and prices under the Packers and Stockyards Act); Highland v. Russell Car &
Snowplow Co., 279 U.S. 253,258-62 (1929) (upholding federal price fixing during World War I).
196. 287 U.S. 283 (1932).
197. Jackson, 287 U.S. at 287.
198. Id. at 288.
199. See id. at 289-91 (justifying the need for this particular consumer protection measure).
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Tyson, Ribnik, and Williams all proceeded on the theory that the
states lack the power to regulate prices for businesses not affected with a
public interest." ° Insurance, on the other hand, had long been regarded as
a business so affected." In part for this reason, the old Court upheld sev-
eral different regulations on the subject. These included a law regulating
the impact of misrepresentations in life insurance applications, " a meas-
ure penalizing insurers that collude to fix rates 3 a statute ensuring the
insurer's continued liability despite the insured's insolvency,"' a provi-
sion compelling arbitration of policy disputes,' and a law making insur-
ance contracts for hail loss take effect twenty-four hours after the appli-
cation.' The Court also upheld two statutes requiring that certain busi-
nesses insure.'" Although banking probably never attained "affected with
a public interest" status," the old Court generally rejected substantive
due process challenges to regulation of that industry. The main examples
are Noble State Bank v. Haskell' and two companion cases," ' in which
the Court upheld laws charging banks a fee to create guaranty funds for
their customers."'
Pushing the category of consumer protection to its furthest exten-
sion are three Lochner era cases upholding regulations of the securities
200. See Williams, 278 U.S. at 239-40; Ribnik, 277 U.S. at 355-58; Tyson, 273 U.S. at 430-31.
On the affected-with-a-public-interest doctrine, see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
201. The leading case is German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U.S. 389, 405-18 (1914).
202. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 203 U.S. 243, 249, 252-55 (1906) (upholding a
statute saying that no misrepresentation in a life insurance application is material, or can void the
contract, unless the matter misrepresented contributed to the contingency insured against;
intertwined equal protection and due process challenges).
203. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Hale, 219 U.S. 307, 313, 315-19 (1911) (upholding a statute
allowing insured to recover twenty-five percent of covered loss from insurer connected with a tariff
association that fixed rates).
204. Merchants Mut. Auto. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Smart, 267 U.S. 126, 128-30 (1925) (upholding a
statute saying that, in auto insurance contracts, the insurer remains liable dispite the insured's
insolvency or bankruptcy).
205. Hardware Dealers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S. 151, 157-59 (1931)
(upholding a statute compelling arbitration where the parties cannot agree on the loss payable under
a fire insurance policy, and imposing an arbitration clause in the standard fire policy).
206. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Wanberg, 260 U.S. 71,73-77 (1922).
207. Hedge Drive-It-Yourself Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335, 336-37 (1932)
(upholding a law requiring that auto rental companies pay license fees on vehicles and insure against
their negligent operation); Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 145 (1924) (finding valid a law
requiring that taxi companies be insured).
208. During his exhaustive 1923 attempt to make sense of the affected-with-a-public-interest
doctrine, Chief Justice Taft cited as one example of its application Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219
U.S. 104 (1911), a banking case. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S.
522, 535 (1923). But I do not read Noble State Bank as specifically reaching this conclusion.
209. 219 U.S. 104, 110-13 (1911) (upholding a law imposing one percent fee on bank deposits
to establish fund to pay for protection of customers of failing banks).
210. Assaria State Bank v. Dolley, 219 U.S. 121 (1911); Shallenberger v. First State Bank, 219
U.S. 114(1911).
211. Assaria State Bank, 219 U.S. at 125-27; Noble, 219 U.S. at 113; Shallenberger, 219 U.S.
at 120.
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industry against substantive due process attacks.22 These laws involved
bans on practices-futures contracts and stock purchases on margin-
that hardly any legislature would think to prohibit today. Advertising is
another area in which the old Court's treatment of government regulation
was more deferential than contemporary beliefs would lead one to ex-
pect. Today, of course, government regulation of commercial speech is
subjected to a fairly stringent form of intermediate First Amendment
scrutiny. 3 During the Lochner era, however, the Court applied little
more than rigorous rational-basis review while upholding two laws re-
stricting commercial advertising."' Even though the First Amendment
had already been incorporated within Fourteenth Amendment due proc-
ess by the time one of these cases was decided,2 ' both were more or less
normal Lochner-era substantive due process decisions that did not in-
volve the free speech guarantee.
By now, we have moved away from laws best characterized as con-
sumer protection measures, and toward measures ordinarily regarded as
government regulation of business. Relatively clear examples of Lochner
Court decisions upholding the latter include two cases involving lien
laws, 16 two more concerning the regulation of bulk sales,27 and several
involving miscellaneous business matters.2 8 A more common kind of
212. Broadnax v. Missouri, 219 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1911) (upholding a state statute forbidding
maintenance of any place where futures contracts traded); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608-10
(1903) (upholding a state constitutional provision voiding all margin sales of, and futures contracts
for, corporate stock, as applied to margin sales); Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425, 428-32 (1902)
(rejecting a challenge to a state statute criminalizing and voiding certain options and futures
contracts).
213. See, e.g., 44Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S. Ct. 1495, 1505-08 (1996).
214. Packer Corp. v. Utah, 285 U.S. 105, 110-11 (1932) (dismissing a substantive due process
challenge to a state law forbidding tobacco advertising on billboards, street car signs, and placards,
because the subject was within the police power, an evil existed, and the means for its suppression
were appropriate); Fifth Ave. Coach Co. v. City of New York, 221 U.S. 467, 481-83 (1911) (finding
that the prohibition of advertising on buses is within the police power); cf. supra note 162 and
accompanying text (citing a case involving limitations on the placement of billboards).
215. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
216. Endicott-Johnson Corp. v. Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 266 U.S. 285, 290 (1924) (upholding
a statute creating lien against future wages of judgment debtor); Great S. Fire Proof Hotel Co. v.
Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 548-50 (1904) (finding a state mechanics' lien law to be valid).
217. Kidd, Dater & Price Co. v. Musselman Grocer Co., 217 U.S. 461, 471-74 (1910)
(following Lemieux). Lemieux v. Young, 211 U.S. 489, 494-96 (1909) (upholding a state law
requiring notice of sale of a merchant's entire stock-in-trade).
218. James-Dickinson Farm Mortgage Co. v. Harry, 273 U.S. 119, 123-24 (1927) (upholding a
statute expanding fraud liability to include not only misrepresentations regarding past or existing
facts, but also false promises); Delaware, Lackawanna & W. R.R. v. United States, 231 U.S. 363,
369-70 (1913) (addressing a federal law forbidding railroads from transporting their own property in
interstate commerce, unless the property was necessary for their business as common carriers);
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 266-69 (1912) (upholding a state statute forbidding junk
dealers from buying wire or copper used by a railroad, telephone or telegraph company, without first
determining that the seller had a right to sell); Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.S. 225, 232-35
(1911) (rejecting a challenge to a state law restricting certain assignments of wages by employees);
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business regulation during the years 1902-1932, albeit one with its con-
sumer protection aspects, was state antitrust regulation. In this area as in
many others, the old Court tended to defer to the legislature, rejecting
due process attacks on five of the six measures it considered."9 And the
lone antitrust law that it struck down was decided on narrow grounds. In
Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,m the Court considered a state law
forbidding price discrimination between localities in dairies' purchase of
milk products.' Because the law forbade price discrimination irrespec-
tive of motive, the Court said, it lacked a reasonable relation to the pre-
vention of predatory bidding and thus violated due process." This leads
one to believe that the Court would have upheld an earlier version of the
statute that did require an anticompetitive purpose.
6. Restrictions on Entry
Sometimes states pursue their consumer protection mission by ban-
ning a particular trade, industry, or line of commerce. Such laws obvi-
ously interfere with the right to pursue a trade, profession, or business.
On much that same basis, the Lochner Court's 1917 decision in Adams v.
Tannerm struck down Washington's virtual ban on employment agen-
cies. Another way that the states sometimes try to protect consumers-
and restrict the right to pursue an occupation-is by banning the sale of
particular products by particular parties. The old Court upheld at least
one of these laws against a substantive due process challenge." '
The most common limitations on occupational freedom the old
Court encountered, however, were not outright bans on the pursuit of
some business, but limitations or restrictions on entry to it. Entry restric-
tions take several forms, but perhaps the most common is the familiar
Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302, 308-11 (1910) (upholding a Philippine law forbidding
the exportation of silver coins from the Islands).
219. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S. 157, 162 (1912) (upholding a state statute
forbidding price discrimination in sale of commodities); Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, 217
U.S. 433, 441-43 (1910) (rejecting a due process challenge to a state antitrust law); National Cotton
Oil Co. v. Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 127-30 (1905) (upholding a state antitrust law); Smiley v. Kansas,
196 U.S. 447, 453-57 (1905) (upholding a state antitrust law); Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194,
203-05 (1904) (allowing a statute forbidding combinations for the purpose of willfully or
maliciously injuring another in his occupation or business). But cf. Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Coop. Mktg. Ass'n, 276 U.S. 71, 89-97 (1928) (upholding a state cooperative
marketing act with what perhaps are some anticompetitive features).
220. 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
221. Fairmont Creamery Co., 274 U.S. at 3.
222. Id. at 8-9.
223. 244 U.S. 590 (1917). The law struck down in Adams was a state initiative making it
unlawful for employment agencies to receive fees from people seeking employment, in return for
furnishing those people with employment or with information leading thereto. Id. at 592-97.
224. Baccus v. Louisiana, 232 U.S. 334, 337-38 (1914) (addressing a state law forbidding the
sale of drugs by itinerant vendors).
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phenomenon of occupational licensing.2" The Lochner Court sustained a
wide variety of licensing laws and their functional equivalents against
several different constitutional attacks during the 1902-1932 period. 6
Only four of these cases look like clear applications of substantive due
process. '7 Several more, however, may be best characterized in that
fashion.22
But while the old Court almost invariably upheld occupational li-
censing laws that prevented individuals from pursuing some trade or
profession, it was much tougher on other kinds of entry restrictions. New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann2" and Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge2' are
the two best known examples." The old Court also struck down three
state trucking laws converting private carriers into public carriers and
thereby subjecting them to much more extensive requirements for doing
business, "2 while upholding one such law.233 It also struck down two other
225. The old Court upheld a related restriction on occupational freedom, a license tax, in three
substantive due process cases decided in 1916. Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 363-
67 (1916); Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 381-86 (1916) (following Rast); Pitney v. Washington,
240 U.S. 387, 390-91 (1917) (following Rast and Tanner).
226. See Michael J. Phillips, Entry Restrictions in the Lochner Court, 4 GEo. MASON L. REv.
405,431-34 (1996).
227. Graves v. Minnesota, 272 U.S. 425, 426-29 (1926) (upholding dentistry licensing); La
Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465, 467-68 (1919) (involving insurance brokerage); Payne v.
Kansas ex rel. Brewster, 248 U.S. 112, 112-13 (1918) (upholding restriction on the sale of farm
produce on commission); McNaughton v. Johnson, 242 U.S. 344, 348-49 (1917) (involving
optometry).
228. See Weller v. New York, 268 U.S. 319,324-25 (1925) (conducting a substantive review of
law requiring license to resell theater tickets, but not clearly due process review); Merchants' Exch.
v. Missouri ex rel. Barker, 248 U.S. 365, 367-68 (1919) (conducting a substantive review of law
forbidding weighing of grain at public warehouses by anyone except authorized and bonded state
weigher, but making no clear reference to due process); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S.
568, 590 (1917) (following Hall); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 242 U.S. 559, 564-68
(1917) (following Hal); Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550-52 (1917) (substantively
reviewing a law requiring license for securities brokers, but making no clear reference to due
process); Lehon v. City of Atlanta, 242 U.S. 53, 54-55 (1916) (applying substantive review in a
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to an ordinance limiting entry to the position of private detective);
Brazee v. Michigan, 241 U.S. 340, 343-44 (1916) (applying substantive review in a Fourteenth
Amendment challenge to a licensing scheme for employment agencies); Collins v. Texas, 223 U.S.
288, 295-97 (1912) (applying substantive review in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a law
limiting entry to the practice of osteopathy); Engel v. O'Malley, 219 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1911)
(applying substantive review in a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a licensing law for private
banking, with a separate equal protection discussion).
229, 285 U.S. 262, 273-80 (1932) (striking down a state law limiting access to the ice
business).
230. 278 U.S. 105, 111-14 (1928) (invalidating a state law essentially requiring that every
pharmacy or drug store going into business after the law's passage be wholly owned by a licensed
pharmacist or pharmacists).
231. For more on these two cases, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 438-41, 443-47 and infra
notes 297-304 and accompanying text.
232. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 563 (1931); Frost v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583,
592-99 (1926); Michigan Pub. Utils. Comn'n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570, 577-78 (1925). For more on
these cases, the other constitutional issues they presented, and some other cases presenting those
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measures that impeded freedom of occupation. In Smith v. Texas,"' the
Court invalidated a state statute making it a misdemeanor to serve as a
freight train conductor without having previously served for two years as
a brakeman on freight trains.23 In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,' it sustained
a due process attack by Chinese businesspeople on a Philippine statute
making it illegal to keep business accounts in any language other than
English, Spanish, or a local dialect. "7
7. Employment
Among the cases commonly cited as representative of Lochner era
substantive due process,238 those involving regulation of the employment
relationship loom large. These decisions include Lochner itself,239 Muller
v. Oregon," Bunting v. Oregon,"4 ' Adair v. United States,""2 Coppage v.
Kansas,"3 and Adkins v. Children's Hospital.'"
These cases are supplemented by several related 1902-1932 deci-
sions-some fairly well known and some less so. In addition to Muller,
the old Court rejected due process attacks on at least four other state laws
setting maximum hours for women.2 ' As for wages, the Court followed
issues, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 435-38. Common carriers undertake to carry all persons or
their goods, while private carriers undertake to carry particular people or particular goods on
particular occasions.
233. Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251, 265-69 (1932).
234. 233 U.S. 630 (1914).
235. Smith, 233 U.S. at 636-39. This case found the law unconstitutional on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds without specifying a specific provision, but indicating that life, liberty,
property, and equal protection are closely related. Id. at 636.
236. 271 U.S. 500 (1926).
237. Yu Cong Eng, 271 U.S. at 524-27.
238. See supra notes 12-41 and accompanying text.
239. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57-64 (1905) (striking down a maximum-hours law
for bakery employees).
240. 208 U.S. 412, 417-23 (1908) (upholding a state maximum hours law for women).
241. 243 U.S. 426, 434-39 (1917) (upholding a state maximum hours law for factory workers).
Bunting often is read as overruling Lochner sub silentio. E.g., CuRRIE, supra note 9, at 103.
242. 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908) (striking down a federal law that forbade the firing of
railroad workers due to their union affiliation).
243. 236 U.S. 1, 8-20 (1915) (rejecting a state statute banning yellow dog contracts). Yellow
dog contracts make membership in a union a condition of a worker's employment.
244. 261 U.S. 525, 545-62 (1923) (overturning a District of Columbia minimum wage law for
women and children).-Six years before Adkins was decided, a per curiam decision by an equally
divided Court had affirmed lower court decisions upholding minimum wage laws. Stettler v. O'Hara,
243 U.S. 629 (1917).
245. Bosley v. McLaughlin, 236 U.S. 385, 392-94 (1915) (reviewing an eight hour daily
maximum for women, as applied to graduate nurses in hospitals); Miller v. Wilson, 236 U.S. 373,
379-82 (1915) (evaluating statutory limitations of an eight hour day for women in a wide range of
occupations); Riley v. Massachusetts, 232 U.S. 671, 679-81 (1914) (reviewing a ten hour daily limit
for women working in manufacturing or mechanical establishments). See also Hawley v. Walker,
232 U.S. 718 (1914) (upholding a maximum hours law for women on the authority of Muller v.
Oregon).
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Adkins in two cases decided before 1933 and one thereafter.2" In the
same year that it decided Adkins, furthermore, the Court overturned por-
tions of a state industrial relations act empowering a state body to set pay
rates and other terms of employment in businesses the state deemed af-
fected with a public interest. 7 Roughly complementing the Court's less
than fervid embrace of organized labor in Adair and Coppage, finally, is
a 1921 decision striking down one application of a state statute limiting
the use of injunctions and restraining orders in labor disputes.2"
The three main themes that emerge from the preceding discussion
are the old Court's occasional willingness to invalidate legislation bene-
fitting unions, its general tendency to uphold maximum-hours laws (es-
pecially for women), and its hard line against regulation of wages. In
part, at least, the last of these themes reflected the old Court's view that
the price paid for goods or services is central to any contract.2 9 Thus, as
Justice Sutherland observed in Adkins,' the Court was willing to sustain
laws prescribing the character, methods, and time for the payment of
wages, because such laws were aimed at abuses such as fraud rather than
at the substance of the deal." As Sutherland also observed, the Court had
upheld statutes regulating wages and other matters in public works con-
tracts, basing those rulings on "the right of the government to prescribe
the conditions upon which it will permit work of a public character to be
done for it."'"
246. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 603-18 (1936); Donham v. West-
Nelson Mfg. Co., 273 U.S. 657 (1927); Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925).
247. Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus. Relations, 262 U.S. 522, 534-44(1923); see
also Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U.S. 286, 289-91 (1924) (accepting Charles Wolff Packing Co. while
declining to decide whether a provision of the act at issue there was separable from it, and returning
the case to the state for a decision on this issue); Charles Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Indus.
Relations, 267 U.S. 552, 566-69 (1925) (striking down a maximum-hours provision contained in a
writ of mandamus issued by a state supreme court following the first Charles Wolff Packing Co.
case's return to that court).
248. Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 (1921). In this case, the state law was applied to permit
union picketing and handbilling that libelled a restaurant owner and threatened injury to his
customers. Id. at 327-30.
249. E.g., Adkins, 261 U.S. at 553-54 (stating that the amount of wages to be paid and received
is "at the heart" of a labor contract).
250. Id. at 547.
251. See Rail & River Coal Co. v. Yaple, 236 U.S. 338, 349-55 (1915) (upholding a state law
requiring that coal miners' pay be based, generally speaking, on car loads of coal they produced);
Erie R.R. v. Williams, 233 U.S. 685, 699-704 (1914) (rejecting a challenge to a state law requiring
that railroads pay their employees semi-monthly in cash); McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.S. 539, 545-
51 (1909) (upholding a state law requiring that, for payment purposes, coal produced by miners be
weighed as it comes from the mine, and before it is passed over a screen).
252. Adkins, 261 U.S. at 547; see Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1915) (allowing a
state law giving citizens a preference over aliens in employment on public works); Crane v. New
York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (a companion case to Heim); Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 219-24
(1903) (upholding a state law regulating wages and hours of workers employed by municipal paving
contractors); cf. Ellis v. United States, 206 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1907) (upholding a federal statute
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Of course, the Lochner Court also was willing to sustain employ-
ment regulations with some reasonable link to worker health and safety.
The asserted absence of such a link doomed the maximum-hours law at
issue in Lochner," and beliefs about women's special susceptibility to
the trials of industrial labor helped justify maximum-hours laws for their
protection.' The Court also upheld state laws on health, safety, and gen-
eral welfare grounds, forbidding the employment of children below six-
teen in certain hazardous occupations," prohibiting the night time em-
ployment of women in restaurants located in large cities, " regulating the
width of entries to coal mines," and requiring coal mines to maintain
wash houses for their employees at the request of twenty or more work-
ers."o Fitting roughly within this category, finally, are two decisions up-
holding state laws that required employers to grant requests by departing
employees for a letter stating the particulars of their employment and the
reasons for their leaving the job."9
The most important Lochner Court substantive due process cases
regarding workers' health, safety, and welfare--cases rarely noted in
standard treatments of the subject-are its many decisions upholding
workers' compensation laws and other measures regulating employee
recovery for on the job injuries. In two 1911 decisions, the Court upheld
federal and state laws that prevented employer and employee from con-
tracting out of the former's statutorily created liability for on-the-job
injuries.2" Six years later, in New York Central Railroad v. White 6' and
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington,2"2 it rejected substantive due proc-
ess challenges to workers' compensation laws for hazardous employ-
limiting the hours worked by federal workers or employees of federal contractors to eight per day;
decided on authority of Atkin without mentioning due process).
253. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58-61 (1905).
254. See, e.g., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 421-23 (1908).
255. Sturges & Bum Mfg. Co. v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320,325-26 (1913).
256. Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 293-95 (1924).
257. Barrett v. Indiana, 229 U.S. 26, 28-29 (1913); cf. Wilmington Star Mining Co. v. Fulton,
205 U.S. 60, 70-74 (1907) (upholding as consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment a state law
requiring licensure of mine managers and examiners and making mine liable for their willful failure
to furnish a reasonably safe place for workers).
258. Booth v. Indiana, 237 U.S. 391, 395-97 (1915).
259. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 534-36 (1922); Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
Ry. v. Perry, 259 U.S. 548, 555-56 (1922).
260. Second Employers' Liab. Cases, 223 U.S. 1, 52-53 (1911) (upholding provision of federal
law covering railroads' liability for their employees' on-the-job injuries that voids any contract by
which employer tries to eliminate its liability under the act); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v.
McGuire, 219 U.S. 549, 563-73 (1911) (upholding provision of state law governing railroads'
liability for their employees' workplace injuries that prevented any contract of insurance relief,
benefit, or indemnity between employer and employee from operating as a defense to the statutory
liability); see also Bowersock v. Smith, 243 U.S. 29, 34-35 (1917) (holding that a state statute
making employer liable for failure to properly guard manufacturing equipment does not violate due
process as applied to employee who had contracted with the employer to provide the safeguards
whose absence caused his death).
261. 243 U.S. 188, 196-208 (1917).
262. 243 U.S. 219, 235-46 (1917).
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ments that contained many of the features found in contemporary laws of
this kind-for example, strict liability; the elimination of contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, and the fellow-servant rule as employer
defenses; and a statutory scheme of damage recoveries.263 The old Court's
subsequent decisions sustaining workers' compensation provisions con-
cerned matters such as employee recoveries, ' other parties eligible for
recovery, '5 the industries covered by the act, " scope-of-employment
questions,' the operation of elective systems," and the fees attorneys
could charge clients.269
B. Summarizing the Results
As Warren observed in his 1913 article, successful due process at-
tacks on government action were much more likely to involve "private
rights of property" than "social justice legislation."" Included within
Warren's first category are utility rate decisions and other deprivations of
utility property."' If we omit these two classes from the Court's 1902-
1932 substantive due process decisions, the ratio of unsuccessful to suc-
cessful challenges is somewhat below four to one. If in addition we
eliminate the cases involving civil liability, remedies, presumptions, and
taxation," the ratio is about four and a half to one. And if we limit our-
263. The Court also upheld a similar measure in 1919. See Arizona Employers' Liability Cases,
250 U.S. 400, 420-31 (1919). Later, on grounds resembling those it used to sustain similar state
laws, the Court upheld the substantive and remedial provisions of the federal Longshoreman's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act against a due process attack. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22,
41-42 (1932).
264. New York Cent. R.R. v. Bianc, 250 U.S. 596, 600-03 (1919) (rejecting employer's claim
that employee recovery for disfigurement deprives employer of property without due process).
265. New York State Rys. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 379, 383-84 (1924) (upholding law requiring
that, when employee dies without beneficiaries, employer must make contribution to state workers'
compensation fund); R.E. Sheehan Co. v. Shuler, 265 U.S. 371, 376-78 (1924) (involving same facts
and resulting in indentical holding as Shuler); Madera Sugar Pine Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 262 U.S. 499, 500-04 (1923) (finding no violation of due process for otherwise-valid
workers' compensation law requiring that compensation for accidental death be paid to employee's
nonresident alien dependents). See also Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 281
U.S. 98, 106-08 (1930) (upholding a portion of the law at issue in New York State Rys. and Sheehan
Co. which required that the employer be indemnified by a third party against whom the employee
had recovered outside workers' compensation).
266. Ward & Gow v. Krinsky, 259 U.S. 503, 510-16 (1922) (upholding the extension of the law
at issue in White to most occupations in which four or more workers are employed).
267. Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154, 158-59 (1928); Cudahy Packing Co. v.
Parramore, 263 U.S. 418, 422-26 (1923). Both cases upheld workers' compensation recoveries
where the employees were killed while going to work.
268. Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 155, 162-63 (1919) (finding that an
employee was not deprived of liberty and property without due process when state law required him
to accept workers' compensation at his employer's election).
269. Yeiser v. Dysart, 267 U.S. 540, 541 (1925) (upholding a state law restricting the fees
attorneys could charge clients in workers' compensation cases).
270. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
271. See supra note 4; see also supra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 101 -31 and accompanying text.
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selves to the decisions contemporary critics of Lochner era substantive
due process emphasize-general police matters, regulation of business
and trade, and employment law 73-the ratio exceeds five to one. For the
employment cases alone, finally, the ratio was between three and four to
one."" Going some way toward explaining these figures is the Court's
decided tendency to uphold two overlapping categories of laws: health
and safety regulations and consumer protection measures."'
Within the entire collection of 1902-1932 substantive due process
cases just discussed, on the other hand, the ratio of unsuccessful to suc-
cessful challenges is just below two and a half to one. As the preceding
discussion suggests, this lower ratio mainly reflects the Court's greater
propensity to accept substantive due process challenges in "property
rights" cases than in "social justice" cases. For example, decisions over-
turning utility rate orders, where the old Court probably struck down
more rulings than it upheld,' comprised over one-third of the successful
substantive due process challenges during the years 1902-1932. Also
contributing to the lower overall ratio are the decisions involving regu-
latory orders directed at utilities, remedial provisions, tax laws, and entry
restrictions, where the Court. struck down significant percentages of the
laws it considered. 7 Still other contributors to the overall figure fall
within the categories where the ratio of unsuccessful to successful chal-
lenges was four or five to one. These include the cases involving mini-
mum wage laws, laws benefitting organized labor, price regulations, and
land use regulations. 8 Each of these subcategories, that is, bucked the
trend for its general category. If we cut the pie a different way, finally,
another interesting point emerges. Of the laws struck down on substan-
tive due process grounds between 1902 and 1932, nearly half were rate
orders for regulated industries, minimum wage laws, or laws fixing the
cost of consumer goods to consumers." In other words, nearly half of
these laws involved the regulation of prices."
Although my two-and-a-half-to-one overall ratio does not comport
with Warren's figures," it conveys a similar overall message: that the
Lochner Court rejected considerably more substantive due process
claims than it granted. More importantly, the four-to-one and five-to-one
ratios that prevail outside the "property rights" cases make clear that the
old Court upheld a great deal of progressive social legislation against
273. See supra notes 132-222, 238-69 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 239-69 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 146-65, 179-222, 253-69 and accompanying text. One conspicuous
exception to this generalization, however, concerns the cases involving price regulation. See supra
notes 191-95, 244-47 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
277. See supra notes 97-107, 122-31, 223-36 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 166-78, 191-95, 244, 246-48 and accompanying text.
279. See supra notes 89, 191-93,244, 246-47 and accompanying text.
280. This tendency receives more attention infra at notes 330-39 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 3-4,9 and accompanying text.
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substantive due process attacks. One obvious reason for the disparity
between my numbers and Warren's is the different time periods from
which they are drawn. But the main reason is his much broader base of
decisions, which include equal protection cases, procedural due process
decisions, and the "incorporation" cases I explicitly did not consider.2"
Even within the universe of decisions considered here, furthermore, I
usually rejected cases that did not clearly involve either due process or
substantive review. Since almost all of these decisions refused the due
process challenge, this means that my figures probably overstate sub-
stantive due process's impact.
IM. THE CRITICISMS RECONSIDERED
In addition to corroborating Warren's general point, the preceding
figures belie Justice Souter's assertion that the old Court's substantive
due process cases applied their standard of constitutional arbitrariness in
an "absolutist" fashion. 3 Or at least those figures show that the Court's
review cannot have been absolutist across the board.' But if Warren
largely was correct and Souter largely is wrong, what does this say about
the three familiar criticisms of Lochner era substantive due process
sketched in this article's first section? The first of these attacks, which
applies to substantive due process in all its forms, asserts that the doc-
trine licenses illegitimate exercises of judicial power. The second says
that the old Court's substantive due process decisions unjustifiably aided
business in its struggles with workers and other relatively powerless in-
dividuals and groups. The third adds that those decisions were con-
sciously intended to have that effect.
This section considers the preceding section's implications for these
three criticisms. In other words, it limits itself to conclusions, that flow
from the patterns of substantive due process decision making just dis-
cussed. Due to that limitation, I do not fully discuss certain questions
(e.g., the. prevalence of unequal bargaining power) that have to be ad-
dressed in any definitive evaluation of Lochner era substantive due proc-
ess. Nonetheless, the following discussion at least weakens the first two
attacks, while seriously crippling the third. I open with that third tradi-
tional assault on the old Court.
282. See supra notes 72-75, 116-18 and accompanying text (depicting particular
"incorporation" cases).
283. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2279 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring); see
supra text accompanying note 65.
284. However, maybe one could argue that the rule the Court applied in its 1920s price
regulation cases, which made their constitutionality depend on the relevant industry's being affected
with a public interest, qualifies as an "absolutist" standard. See supra notes 191-93, 200 and
accompanying text. The better word, though, might be "mechanical."
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A. The Question of Motive
Most critics of Lochner era substantive due process agree that the
doctrine assisted business while disadvantaging workers and other rela-
tively powerless groups because it enabled the Court to strike down pro-
gressive social legislation intended to assist and protect them. But as we
have seen, ' critics disagree about the degree to which the Court's con-
servative justices recognized, intended, and/or desired this result. Here, I
begin by considering the claim that those justices were witting and will-
ing servants of business in its assaults on the disadvantaged. Then I con-
sider two other interpretations of the old Court that put it in a much more
favorable light. Throughout, my concern is with the motives that inspired
the Court's substantive due process cases. As will become evident, it is
most unlikely that the desire to assist business ranked high among those
motives.
1. The Agent-of-Business Explanation
Critics of the Lochner Court who assert that it was a knowing and
willing tool of business hardly lack ammunition for their attack. The old
Court's minimum-wage and anti-labor cases, they can say, directly aided
business and hurt workers, just as its price regulation decisions helped
business and hurt consumers. Furthermore, the critics can continue, the
Court's decisions knocking down rate and regulatory orders for railroads
and other regulated industries obviously helped those frmns, their share-
holders, and their bondholders prosper at the public's expense. Finally,
businesses of all kinds profited to some degree from the Court's deci-
sions on damage recoveries and its tax decisions. So tangible and obvi-
ous are these effects, our critic might conclude, that they must have been
the reasons the old Court decided as it did. What else could explain such
cases?
If one wants to criticize a legal doctrine for the motives that inspired
it, one's case is weakened if those motives fail to exhibit themselves in
all or most of the doctrine's applications. Thus, the critics' case is par-
tially blunted by the large number of occasions on which the old Court
upheld laws challenged on substantive due process grounds. Except for
the minimum-wage cases and the union cases, the Court sustained many
of the protective regulations it confronted within each category of deci-
sions listed in the previous paragraph. This pattern continues when we
consider the Lochner Court's decisions concerning matters such as
health, safety, and aesthetic regulations in general and worker safety in
particular; consumer protection; antitrust; maximum hours laws; and the
regulation of insurance and banking. Like the measures noted above,
most of these laws probably tended to disadvantage business and to assist
285. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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the public or segments of it. Yet the Lochner Court rejected substantive
due process challenges in a very high percentage of these cases.
To all this, a critic might reply that what counts are the Court's
cases striking down social legislation on substantive due process
grounds, not the inevitable cases upholding such legislation. Some of
these cases, however, have policy arguments in their favor. This suggests
that the justices deciding them may have had motives other than the de-
sire to benefit business. The old Court's rate decisions, for example, were
inspired at least in part by the fear that state legislatures and regulators
would curry favor with the public by setting rates too low,2" thus inhib-
iting private investment in these vitally important industries." ' These
fears hardly seem chimerical: some of the rate orders the old Court struck
down look questionable," and the problem of legislative and regulatory
bias against (and for) regulated industries persists to this day."' This last
point also holds in the area of civil remedies, where the modem Court
has been forced to reinvoke substantive due process to handle problems
similar to those the Lochner Court faced early in the century.' Turning
to price regulations in businesses not affected with a public interest,
economists routinely attack such measures for their tendency to create
artificial shortages of the regulated commodity or service."' Similarly,
the minimum wage comes under constant fire for reducing employment,
especially among marginal workers such as blacks, young people, and
middle aged women.'
Obviously, these and other arguments that might be made for the
old Court's decisions go only so far in justifying them. But the question
here is the motive for such decisions-specifically, the contention that
nothing other than pro-business bias could possibly have inspired them.
A critic might reply that such bias remains a possibility because it is un-
clear whether these arguments really motivated the Court, and because it
is certain that the decisions in question helped business overcome pro-
gressive social legislation. The same, he might continue, holds for sub-
stantive due process as a whole. At least one category of Lochner era
286. See, e.g., ELY, CHIEF JUsTIc-sHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER, supra note 82, at 88; see also
Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police the
Political Institutions?, 77 GEO. LJ. 2031, 2044-45 (1989).
287. ELY, CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE FULLER, supra note 82, at 88; Porter, supra note
62, at 143.
288. See, e.g., Detroit United Ry. v. City of Detroit, 248 U.S. 429, 434-36 (1919) (striking
down a municipal ordinance regulating street railway fares because its enforcement would result in a
deficit for the company).
289. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 286, at 2048-53 (describing state regulators' alternate patterns
of excessively favoring and disfavoring electric utilities during the 1950s through the 1980s).
290. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
291. See, e.g., WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND
EXTENSIONs 432-34 (4th ed. 1989).
292. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 308-10 (3d ed. 1986).
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substantive due process cases striking down government action, how-
ever, cannot plausibly be regarded as favoring business interests and
disadvantaging the powerless. The category in question consists of the
old Court's entry restriction cases. As Herbert Hovenkamp once re-
marked about such cases:
These decisions simply cannot be characterized as a judicial choice to
side with business against labor, immigrants, and the poor. On the
contrary, they permitted such groups increased entry into established
markets in the face of protectionist legislation designed either to ex-
clude newcomers directly or to give established firms a cost advan-
tage over prospective entrants. 93
By striking down laws that favored established economic interests, in
other words, the old Court's entry restriction decisions confound one of
the most enduring stereotypes about the Lochner era. This further di-
minishes the likelihood that the doctrine had its genesis in a desire to
protect big business.
Although restrictions on entry to a trade, profession, or business
have their justifications,' too many of them exist primarily to benefit
existing practitioners by reducing competition. This is especially true of
occupational licensing. As one opponent of that practice puts the matter,
by lessening competition "[o]ccupational regulation has served to limit
consumer choice, raise consumer costs, increase practitioner income,
limit practitioner mobility, deprive the poor of adequate services, and
restrict job opportunities for minorities."295 Sometimes, of course, the law
must risk such abuses in order to protect the public against unethical or
incompetent practitioners. Perhaps for this reason, the old Court almost
invariably upheld occupational licensing measures against constitutional
challenges.' The story was different, however, for some of the other
entry restrictions it confronted.
Two examples may suffice to illustrate how the Lochner Court's
handling of entry restrictions undermines the stereotypes that still sur-
round it.' Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Baldridge,8 which the modem Court
293. Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L.
REV. 379, 390 (1988); see id. at 388-90.
294. The most common justifications for entry restrictions are: (1) to allocate inherently scarce
physical resources such as broadcasting frequencies; (2) to get the benefits and prevent the costs of
real or alleged natural monopolies such as electrical power generation and some other businesses
affected with a public interest; and (3) to protect the public against unethical or incompetent
practitioners. Phillips, supra note 226, at 411; see id. at 408-12 and the sources cited therein.
295. S. DAVID YOUNG, THE RULE OF EXPERTS: OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING IN AMERICA !
(1987).
296. See Phillips, supra note 41, at 431-34. For the substantive due process cases involving
occupational licensing, see supra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
297. For a more complete listing and discussion of the old Court's non-occupational licensing
entry restriction cases, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 434-47.
298. 278 U.S. 105 (1928).
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overruled as "a derelict in the stream of the law" in 19 7 3,"' struck down
a Pennsylvania statute which basically required that every pharmacy or
drug store entering the business after the statute's passage be wholly
owned by a licensed pharmacist or pharmacists." Justice Sutherland's
majority opinion emphasized the extent to which Pennsylvania already
regulated drug stores and the tenuous connection between ownership of
such stores' shares and the public health and safety. °' After that, he sug-
gested that the law's real aim was to suppress competition from publicly
traded chain store druggists,3 2 a suggestion Justice Holmes's dissent did
nothing to deny? 3
Today, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann' is best known for the pas-
sages in Justice Brandeis's dissent depicting state legislatures as labora-
tories of democracy with the freedom to try "novel social and economic
experiments."' But it would be difficult to discover less. experimental a
law than the measure at issue in that case. Liebmann involved an Okla-
homa statute requiring a license before one could engage in the manu-
facture, sale, or distribution of ice; and permitting state regulators to
deny new applicants a license if the area to be served already received
adequate service from a licensed ice company. After expending several
pages to determine that the ice business was not affected with a public
interest,' Sutherland got around to characterizing the measure before
him:
[T]he control here asserted does not protect against monopoly but
tends to foster it. The aim is not to encourage competition, but to pre-
vent it; not to regulate the business, but to preclude persons from en-
gaging in it. There is no difference in principle between this case and
the attempt of the dairyman under state authority to prevent another
from keeping cows and selling milk on the ground that there are
enough dairymen in the business.... '07
299. North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973).
300. Liggett, 278 U.S. at 113-14.
301. See id.
302. Id. at 113-14.
303. See id. at 114-15 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his dissent, which was joined by Justice
Brandeis, Holmes argued that the challenged law need only have a "manifest tendency" to lessen the
evil it attacks, and that a firm's ownership probably has some impact on the safety of its operations.
Id. at 114-15. Justice Douglas made a similar argument while writing to uphold a very similar law in
North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 414 U.S. at 166-67.
304. 285 U.S. 262 (1932).
305. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 311 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
306. See id. at 273-78 (Sutherland, J., for the Court). Actually, Sutherland used the term
"charged with a public use." Id. at 273. But he most likely was extending the rule that price
regulation is unconstitutional for businesses not affected with a public interest, see supra notes 191-
93, 200 and accompanying text, to the entry restriction arena; Phillips, supra note 41, at 440-41 &
n.198.
307. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 279.
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Brandeis's much praised dissent did little to counter these arguments.'
In fact, it essentially confirmed them. For example, Brandeis's main ar-
gument in support of the statute was that without it, the Oklahoma ice
industry faced "ruinous competition" in the form of severe price
cutting.'
2. The "Class Legislation" Hypothesis
According to Morton Horwitz, one manifestation of the "Progres-
sive historiography" that still dominates the constitutional history of the
Lochner era "has been to buttress historical interpretations that ... con-
tinue to treat the late-nineteenth-century judiciary as having capitulated
to big business. In fact, it is quite clear ... that the Lochner Court was
strongly representative of the old conservative view that big business was
unnatural and illegitimate." 0 As the previous section should make clear,
the claim that the old Court consciously capitulated to business faces
several telling objections. But what possible sense can it make to suggest
that its conservative justices were (in some sense or another) antibusi-
ness? The entry restriction cases provide a hint.
Limitations on entry typically result from private efforts to suppress
competition, and succeed because those who suffer from the restriction
(potential entrants and the general public) are too few, too scattered,
and/or too uninformed to mount an effective opposition."' Thus, the
Court's decisions striking down such laws can be seen as promoting
government neutrality and equal competition by thwarting private inter-
ests intent on using the state for their own purposes. Prominent among
such interests, of course, are businesses of all kinds. And the political
influence of such firms is apt to increase with their size.
This interpretation of the Lochner Court's substantive due process
decisions found expression in a provocative 1993 book by Howard Gill-
man. According to Gillman, the old Court was:
[Oin guard against not all regulations of the economy but only a par-
ticular kind of government interference in market relations-what the
justices considered 'class' or 'partial' legislation; that is, laws that
308. For an extended critique of Brandeis's dissent, see Phillips, supra note 226, at 443-47. See
also ARKES, supra note 49, at 54-58; POSNER, supra note 292, at 590-93; and BERNARD SIEGAN,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTrTION 132-38 (paperback ed. 1980). My account borrows
heavily from these sources.
309. Liebmann, 285 U.S. at 292 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The industry's hostility to this state
of affairs, he continued, led it to engage in various anticompetitive practices. Id. at 292-93. And once
the Oklahoma law was passed, the industry readily accepted it. Id. at 294.
310. MORTON J. HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960. THE CRISIS
OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 7 (1992).
311. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 226, at 412.
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(from their point of view) promoted only the narrow interests of par-
ticular groups or classes rather than the general welfare."'
Therefore, "[plolice powers jurisprudence during the Lochner era had its
origins in the founders' desire to delegitimize 'factional politics,' at-
tempts by competing classes to use public power to gain unfair or un-
natural advantages over their market adversaries."33 The aim, Gillman
thought, was not to minimize state power or to maximize economic free-
dom, but rather "to prohibit the government from passing laws designed
merely to promote the interests of certain classes at the expense of their
competitors, to impose special burdens and benefits on particular groups
without linking these burdens and benefits to the welfare of the commu-
nity as a whole."3 Thus, he emphatically rejected the view that the old
Court was a knowing and willing tool of business.3"5
Gillman's argument suffers from two interrelated flaws: his appar-
ent ignorance of the full scope of Lochner era substantive due process
and the relatively small number of cases he adduces to support his thesis.
Despite their obvious congruence with that thesis, for example, he barely
mentions the entry restriction cases.3 " (Another absence in Gillman's
account, one this article does nothing to rectify, is his failure to consider
the old Court's equal protection decisions, which may be more relevant
to his argument than its better publicized substantive due process cases.)
Rather than examining the cases Gillman does discuss, " this section
briefly considers whether his argument finds support in the areas where
substantive due process was most effective as a check on government
action.
3 18
As suggested earlier, the old Court's decisions striking down entry
restrictions are obvious examples of class legislation. Partiality to private
interests may also have influenced some of the statutes, ordinances, and
commission orders successfully challenged by railroads and other regu-
lated industries."9 The law at issue in Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v.
Nebraska,3" for instance, basically made railroads build, pay for, and
maintain side tracks to grain elevators at an elevator's request.32' The old
Court's decisions striking down certain remedial provisions might be
characterized as blocking unjustified wealth transfers to undeserving
312. GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 7. For additional statements of Gillman's position see id. at 7-
11,61-62, 199.
313. Id. at 61.
314. Id.
315. E.g., id. at 199. As we will see, however, this does not make Gillman a defender of the old
Court's jurisprudence. See infra note 316 and accompanying text.
316. See GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 181, 261 n.37.
317. See, e.g., id. at 49-60, 64-75, 86-99, 120-31, 137-46, 167-93.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 276-79.
319. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
320. 217 U.S. 196 (1910); see supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
321. Missouri Pac. Ry., 217 U.S. at 204.
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plaintiffs (and their attorneys).3" Perhaps, as Gillman seems to
maintain, " the laws at issue in Adair v. United States32" and Coppage v.
Kansas,3" might be described as pro-union class legislation. While strik-
ing down a state ban on yellow dog contracts in Coppage, for example,
the Court argued that the strengthening of labor unions-or indeed the
strengthening of any particular voluntary association-simply is not a
valid object of the police power. 6 Finally, minimum wage laws for
women may have reflected the interests of male-dominated unions inter-
ested in reducing competition for their members' services.2
Other examples might be adduced, but hopefully enough has been
said to illustrate that Gillman's thesis has some plausibility. Because
most law making has distributional consequences, however, carrying that
thesis to its extreme would render most regulations class legislation and
potential targets for judicial invalidation. As the size of the favored class
increases, moreover, it begins to approximate the general public, at
which point the law favoring the class begins to look like legislation for
the general welfare. Perhaps one could defend, for example, utility rate
regulations and other price regulations on these grounds. A final problem
with Gillman's thesis is that the Lochner Court's substantive due process
cases generally do not speak the language of class legislation.328 Instead
they talk incessantly of property and liberty. Gillman's discussion of
Lochner illustrates the point quite well; as he is forced to admit, that
case's majority opinion simply does not say anything about class, partial,
or unequal legislation."
322. See supra notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
323. GILtMAN, supra note 53, at 139-40. Gillman, I presume, would add that these laws were
justified class legislation.
324. 208 U.S. 161 (1908); see supra note 240 and accompanying text.
325. 236 U.S. I (1915); see supra note 243 and accompanying text.
326. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 16-17. Later, the Court argued that because unions presumably had a
right to exclude members who are willing to work in non-union shops and workers could refuse the
employ of firms that employ nonunion labor, symmetry of treatment demands that employers have
the right to exclude employees for their union affiliation. Id. at 20.
327. SIEGAN, supra note 308, at 148-49.
328. I have been able to find only a few 1902-1932 substantive due process cases using the
terms "class legislation," "class law," "partial legislation," or "partial law." Southern Ry. Co. v.
Clift, 260 U.S. 316, 320 (1922); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 333 (1921); Payne v. Kansas ex
rel. Brewster, 248 U.S. 112, 113 (1918); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219, 239
(1917); Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U.S. 260, 267 (1912); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 418
(1908). In none of these cases was the Court's use of the term vital to its decision. A few equal
protection cases used these terms as well.
329. GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 128; see id. at 125-31 for his complete discussion of Lochner.
Interestingly, Gillman does not consider what may be the best argument for the idea that Lochner's
maximum-hours law was class legislation-Bernard Siegan's contention that it gave large,
mechanized bakeries (whose employees tended to work fewer hours) an edge over their smaller, less
sophisticated counterparts (whose employees tended to work much longer). See SIEGAN, supra note
308, at 115-18. Siegan's argument also is not discussed in Paul Kens's recent history of the Lochner
case. See PAUL KENS, JUDICIAL POWER AND REFORM POLmCS: THE ANATOMY OF LOCHNER V. NEW
YORK (1990).
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3. The Traditional Explanation
Sooner or later, anyone who ponders the Lochner Court's decisions
striking down government action is bound to discover at least one sig-
nificant pattern: over forty percent of them involved price regulations.'"
The vast bulk of these decisions were railroad and utility rate cases; the
others struck down minimum wage laws and laws regulating the prices
of consumer goods and services. As suggested earlier,3 ' one obvious
explanation for this phenomenon is the old Court's belief that the price
paid for goods and services is central to any bargain. This explanation
tends to vindicate the widespread belief that freedom of contract was
central to Lochner era substantive due process. This is true even though,
as was also emphasized earlier,332 relatively few of the old Court's deci-
sions striking down government action formally proceeded on that basis.
For example, both rate rulings for businesses affected with a public inter-
est and consumer price regulations usually were struck down on the the-
ory that they impermissibly deprived the claimant of property.
333
This emphasis on liberty of contract and on its most important exer-
cises may suggest that the old Court had an implicit "preferred free-
doms" or "fundamental rights" theory of the sort that has become explicit
by now'.3' But while this may be true, the old Court never stated any such
theory.3 Its closest approximation to such a theory, perhaps, was Justice
McReynolds's general definition of due process liberty in Meyer v. Ne-
braska.3' Different Lochner Court decisions using due process to strike
down substantive government action emphasize different liberties within
McReynolds's collection. For example, freedom of contract naturally
appears on McReynolds's list. Some explicit or implicit freedom of con-
tract cases have already been mentioned; other examples include union
cases such as Adair and Coppage.33 Meyer and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, by contrast, generally are read as protecting parents' right to control
330. See supra notes 279-80.and accompanying text.
331. See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
332. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
333. See the decisions cited supra in notes 89, 191-93.
334. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267-68 (1997) (listing the
fundamental liberty interests that now get strict substantive due process scrutiny). Included among
these interests are three listed by Justice McReynolds in Meyer, see supra text accompanying note
136. These are the rights to marry, to have children, and to direct the education and upbringing of
one's children.
335. Also militating against the idea that liberty of contract was a preferred freedom during the
Lochner era is the considerable number of cases rejecting substantive due process challenges to laws
that allegedly restricted contractual freedom. I have not attempted a headcount of these cases, but
they outnumber the decisions invalidating laws on this basis, see Phillips, supra note 41, at 1086
n.197, by a huge margin.
336. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra text accompanying note 136.
337. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 14 (1915) (concluding that freedom of contract included
in liberty and property); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172 (1908) (stating that liberty and
property embrace freedom of contract).
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the upbringing and education of their children. 38 Although they do not
always say so, furthermore, the entry restriction cases effectively pro-
mote the right to pursue the trade, business, or occupation of one's
choice. In addition, some of the old Court's land use cases effectively
defended a person's right to live where he or she wishes, even though
they formally involved property.339 The same might be true of the cases
striking down orders to regulated industries, which essentially increased
the regulatee's freedom of action. The tax and civil remedies cases, on
the other hand, probably are best regarded as protecting one's ability to
keep one's money and possessions.
Taken together, these examples suggest that the simplest explana-
tion for the old Court's substantive due process decisions striking down
government regulation is the traditional one: that the justices voting to do
so were friends of liberty (especially economic liberty) and property.
This explanation has the additional advantage of consonance with what
those justices usually said when justifying their decisions. Of course, the
numerous Lochner era cases upholding progressive legislation cannot be
accounted for on this basis. But this reflects little more than the com-
monplace that in many contexts, some values are more important than
personal liberty. And those cases bear equally hard on our other two ex-
planations for the old Court's behavior.
B. Unintentional Support for Business
The preceding section considered a traditional criticism of the
Lochner Court: that it was a knowing and willing servant of business
interests. It did so both by evaluating that claim and by considering two
more favorable motives for the old Court's substantive due process deci-
sions. These were that the Court really was intent upon eliminating class
legislation, and the traditional idea that it aimed to advance liberty, espe-
cially economic liberty. As we have seen, the conscious-agent-of-
business theory not only has intrinsic difficulties, but also has two formi-
dable competitors. Although I have not fully evaluated Gillman's argu-
ment, initially it seems to have less explanatory power than the view that
Lochner era substantive due process was essentially about freedom. But
the two interpretations are not mutually exclusive; few values are more
deeply rooted in American life than the idea of free and equal economic
competition on a neutral playing field.
Even if either or both of our latter two theories best explains
Lochner era substantive due process, however, foes of the doctrine still
can attack it as pro-business in its practical impact. Often, this view as-
serts that the old Court's conservative justices naively stuck to the values
of simpler times in an age when corporate power over workers and other
338. See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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powerless individuals had made those values largely irrelevant."' The
result, of course, was that too often the Court struck down social legisla-
tion designed to correct the imbalance. Gillman, who evidently concedes
that some social legislation is class legislation but sees it as a necessary
response to conditions of "dependency" characterizing industrial life, is
largely of this view." By dependency, he presumably means something
like the traditional view that workers and other individuals lack the
power to bargain effectively when they deal with large corporations. This
article's findings do not speak directly to the validity of this very widely
accepted view. But even if it is completely valid, 2 those findings still go
some way toward absolving the old Court of the charge that in its sub-
stantive due process cases it naively helped business trample the lower
orders.
The first and most important reason why this charge fails to fully
persuade is that the old Court rejected most substantive due process
challenges to social and economic regulation. As we have seen, in many
relevant areas the ratio of rejected challenges to successful ones ap-
proaches or exceeds five to one.3 Included here are laws aimed at pro-
tecting weak and "dependent" parties in areas such as working hours,
compensation for on-the-job injuries, and consumer protection. The sec-
ond reason why the Court's substantive due process cases partly evade
340. See, e.g., supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
341. See, e.g., GILLMAN, supra note 53, at 11, 13-14, 21-22, 76-86,114-18.
342. Although they do not begin to exhaust a subject that probably demands a book, two
interrelated remarks on this subject may be in order. The first is that people too often seem to believe
that if A is a large business firm and B is a natural person, and if B accepts A's offered terms without
any bargaining, then A has superior bargaining power. For example, Roscoe Pound implicitly
adopted this view when he criticized a court for ignoring "actual industrial conditions" by treating
the relation between railroads and their employees "as if the parties were individuals--as if they
were farmers haggling over the sale of a horse." Pound, supra note 39, at 454. But if this is the
model for equal bargaining power, it rarely exists (which probably was Pound's point). And in that
event, government has the right and perhaps the duty to regulate private contracts extensively (which
may not have displeased Pound either). Why, however, are human parties, relatively equal size,
and/or genuine bargaining the criteria for determining whether government intervention is
appropriate? Their imposition would justify regulation of, for example, the simplest terms of
consumer contracts in the most competitive industries.
This leads to my second point, which is that better criteria for determining the
appropriateness of govemment regulation are whether the supposedly weaker parties had genuine
choices, the capacity to identify those choices and appreciate their significance, and the means to
exercise them. Regarding the first criterion, it is worth noting that some economists who study labor
markets and who think along these lines doubt whether monopsony conditions-conditions in which
one firm is a monopoly or oligopoly seller of labor-are common in the United States today. See
Michael J. Phillips, Toward a Middle Way in the Polarized Debate over Employment at Will, 30 Am.
Bus. L.J. 441, 464-65 (1992) and sources cited and discussed therein. Of course, this is not to say
that things were the same during the Lochner era. The second criterion, capacity to identify available
choices, probably varies with the contractual term in question. For example, most people can readily
evaluate a job's wage, but relatively few can handle the details of an employer's health insurance
policy. One example of the third criterion, whether the other party has the means to exercise her
options, would be the availability and cost of transportation to alternative jobs.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 271-75.
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the charge is that many of them either had significant policy justifica-
tions, or simply did not involve the standard oppressor-and-victim sce-
narios. Examples of the former include the utility rate decisions, the
other price regulation cases, and the cases involving remedies.' Exam-
ples of the latter include the entry restriction cases, the land use deci-
sions, and the tax cases. Because they attack the abuse of private eco-
nomic power, in fact, the entry restriction decisions utterly confound the
usual stereotypes applied to the Lochner Court. Perhaps that is why they
receive so little attention.
C. Illegitimate Judicial Behavior
The last, and in some ways the most formidable, objection to
Lochner-era substantive due process applies to all of the doctrine's appli-
cations. This is the familiar argument that, because the traditional mean-
ing of due process is procedural and because that meaning was adopted
by the Framers, substantive due process allows the courts to exercise
power that is not legitimately theirs.' Because my main findings hardly
touch the host of issues this interpretivist or originalist argument raises, I
do not address it at any length. Even assuming that the argument is valid,
however, those findings have definite implications concerning the degree
of the old Court's culpability. Because it rejected considerably more sub-
stantive due process attacks than it granted, at worst the Court sinned
only some of the time. Unless judicial activism is an offense whose
blameworthiness admits of no degrees, that is, the Lochner Court cannot
be judged completely reprehensible under interpretivist criteria.
My findings also suggest two points that concern originalism's justi-
fications. Because the Constitution's text and its Framers' supposed in-
tent do not automatically create an obligation to follow them, this posi-
tion needs a moral or policy justification. Earlier, majoritarianism was
suggested as one possibility.'4 The "class legislation" argument, how-
ever, goes some way toward undermining majority rule as a basis for
attacking the Lochner Court. To the extent that this explanation of the
old Court's behavior is accurate, it was correcting the democratic proc-
ess's malfunctions more than it was overriding majority will. It did so by
insisting that laws bear some reasonable relation to general interests and
thus checking "partial" legislation. If most laws are class legislation,
moreover, judges who practice judicial restraint are not so much follow-
ing the people's will as ratifying whatever mandates a pluralist political
process generates.
Another, far less principled and context-specific, justification for
judicial restraint is the Court's incompetence to handle some kinds of
344. See supra notes 289-92 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
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issues, especially economic questions." This has been a common argu-
ment against the old Court's utility rate decisions,"4 over half of which
overturned the challenged rate order. 9 Because the Lochner Court usu-
ally deferred to the legislature in other areas, however, it may not be es-
pecially vulnerable to this charge outside the regulated industries context.
Furthermore, some of the Court's decisions striking down government
action invoked moral criteria more than social science argumentation.
For example, Justice Sutherland's majority opinion in Adkins proceeded
almost entirely on the levels of precedent and legal-moral principle, and
did not consider the tangle of empirical and policy issues surrounding the
minimum wage." Whatever else might be said about such arguments,
they seem relatively invulnerable to claims that their makers lack the
necessary expertise. Finally, some of the economic claims made by the
old Court do not much depend on such expertise. One does not need a
Ph.D. in economics to see what is wrong with the entry restrictions at
issue in Liggett v. Baldridge and New State Ice Company v. Liebmann.
IV. CRITIQUING THE OLD COURT'S CRITICS
According to Melvin Urofsky, the turn-of-the-century progressive
agenda involved
minimum standards to reduce the incidence of child labor; maximum
hours for women and children and for men employed in dangerous
occupations; payment of wages in cash, to eliminate the abuse of the
scrip system and company store; establishment of a minimum wage,
first for women and children, and then for men; elimination of em-
ployers' common law defenses against liability for job-related acci-
dents; creation of workmen's compensation plans to insure against
death and disability in the factory; and laws supporting labor's right
to organize and bargain collectively. " '
Except for the minimum wage and a few pro-union measures, the
Lochner Court upheld this agenda when it was challenged on substantive
due process grounds."2 From this, one might expect that the old Court
would get at least a "C" on the Progressive report card. Instead it has
been attacked as, either by ignorance or by design, a consistent opponent
of government regulation, champion of business, and foe of the disad-
vantaged. What can account for the mischaracterization?
347. E.g., Antonin Scalia, On the Merits of the Frying Pan, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb. 1985, at
10, 13.
348. Cf Pierce, supra note 286, at 2045-46 (discussing the various institutional limitations that
led the Court to abandon serious review of rate decisions during the 1940s).
349. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
350. See Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525,545-61 (1923).
351. UROFSKY, supra note 54, at 543.
352. See generally supra notes 238-69 and accompanying text.
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Different reasons have been suggested to explain the special hostil-
ity the Lochner Court has attracted. For example, Robert McCloskey
once opined that it resulted from the old Court's own extremism,"3 and
more recently Horwitz has related it to the Progressives' need to legiti-
mize the New Deal by delegitimizing its opponents." The obvious ob-
jection to McCloskey's argument is that the old Court was not all that
extreme. As for Horwitz's explanation, the progressives' task of legiti-
mization might have been accomplished without demonizing the Lochner
Court. For example, progressives could have argued the compelling need
for government regulation by observing that even the reactionaries on the
Supreme Court had signed on to most of it. Both my objections, how-
ever, lose some force when we look beyond the old Court's substantive
due process cases to consider the battles between the Court and the New
Deal during the 1930s, which mainly involved the scope of federal
power.
On the assumption that there need be no one cause for a social phe-
nomenon, I conclude with some speculation about another explanation
for the special obloquy into which the Lochner Court has fallen. In 1924,
Benjamin Cardozo described the divisions on the Court in the following
terms:
On the one hand, the right of property... was posited as permanent
and absolute. Impairment was not to be suffered except within narrow
limits of history and precedent. No experiment was to be made along
new lines of social betterment. The image was a perfect sphere. The
least dent or abrasion was a subtraction from its essence. Given such
premises, the conclusion is inevitable. The statute becomes an ille-
gitimate assault upon rights assured to the individual against the en-
croachments of society. The method of logic or philosophy is at work
in all its plenitude. The opposing view, if it is to be accepted, must be
reached through other avenues of approach. The right which the as-
sailants of the statute posit as absolute or permanent is conceived of
by the supporters of the statute as conditioned by varying circum-
stances of time and space and environment and degree. The limita-
tions appropriate to one stage of development may be inadequate for
another.3"
353. McCloskey, supra note 38, at 42-43 (arguing that the old Court's extremism bred
extremism in subsequent thinking about it).
354. See Morton J. Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional
Thought, 29 WM. & MARY L. REv. 57, 57-63 (1987) (explaining how progressives helped legitimize
New Deal programs and delegitimize the old Court by falsely picturing the latter as a break with
tradition and by touting the Court's supposed return to a noninterventionist stance). Horwitz's
overall position, I might add, seems like Gillman's general view. Although Horwitz rejects the idea
that the Court consciously set out to assist business by killing social legislation and instead pictures
its motives much as Gillman does, he regards its policy of state neutrality as inappropriate to the
industrial age. Id.
355. BENiAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAw 72-73 (1924).
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If this passage accurately described the old Court's conservatives, little
social legislation would have survived substantive due process attack
during the Lochner era. Actually, of course, the Court upheld most of the
reform measures it encountered in many areas of concern to progres-
sives. Cardozo had to know this. So why did he describe the Court's con-
servatives as uncompromising ideologues?
With all the usual qualifications, I suggest the following answer:
that Cardozo's description better fits himself and the old Court's progres-
sive critics than it does the Lochner Court's conservative justices. In
other words, it is the progressives who possessed the "perfect sphere"
whose "least dent or abrasion was a subtraction from its essence." That
essence, I further suggest, was an almost religious faith in government's
ability to improve society through regulations applying social science
knowledge.3" Embrace this faith to the fullest, and almost any exercise of
government power seems a good thing. For example, how else can one
explain Brandeis's characterization of the entry restriction in New State
Ice Co. v. Liebmann as an experiment whose main aim was to rectify
ruinous competition, and his refusal even to consider Sutherland's argu-
ment that the law was special-interest legislation of the most obvious
kind?... To one who thinks in this way, furthermore, degrees of opposi-
tion to the faith cease to matter. The old Court's qualified progressivism,
therefore, really was no progressivism at all.
CONCLUSION
Articles like this one often seem to argue at cross-purposes. On the
one hand, there is the urge to counter the overdrawn portraits of the
Lochner Court that have been so common throughout this century. By
showing that the old Court was more progressive than is commonly
imagined, this corrective approach seems to adopt progressive criteria of
evaluation-to implicitly concede that constitutional limitations on gov-
ernment regulation are a bad thing. But there also is the urge to show that
some of the old Court's most criticized decisions either were not as awful
as advertised or even were justified. This line of attack, however, sug-
gests that constitutional restrictions on government regulation have
something to recommend them after all.
The obvious way to escape this apparent conflict is to assert that
some exercises of government power (those the old Court struck down?)
deserve constitutional limitation, while for others (those it upheld?) the
state should be allowed to work its will. The conflict, in other words,
exists primarily for those who think that one must adopt an all-or-nothing
356. See supra note 8 and accompanying text
357. See supra notes 304-05 and accompanying text. I do not read Brandeis's long dissent as
ever really confronting Sutherland's argument that the Oklahoma entry restriction thwarted
competition for private ends.
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attitude toward government regulation of the economy and constitutional
limitations on such regulation. As this article has made abundantly clear,
the Lochner Court eschewed extremes on this question. Of course, one
might rightly ask whether the old Court picked the proper occasions on
which to intervene. To the progressive tradition that has shaped the mod-
em Court's noninterventionist stance on economic matters, it is illegiti-
mate even to entertain this question. But just why should that tradition
invariably bind us?

